Today's civil wars are becoming more frequent, more harmful to civilians and harder to resolve. Why are sustainable peace outcomes proving more elusive? One contributing factor to these trends may be the increasing use of pro-government militias (PGMs) in armed conflict. Auxiliary forces have played crucial roles in helping governments win back territory, weaken rebel forces or consolidate battlefield strength. They are a quick and cheap means of mobilizing force and may offer unique local knowledge and intelligence, building greater traction among contested communities or constituencies. In some situations, States may turn to PGMs to outsource the "dirty work" of war while maintaining plausible deniability for human rights violations. However, the use of PGMs carries significant risks in terms of post-conflict peace and stability. The research finds that PGMs can be a double-edged sword: in the short-term, they may meet immediate security demands, but over time they can present significant consequences to peace and stability in four areas: undermining the State capacity and authority; the risk to civilians and the rule of law, contributing to further instability; through illicit networks and agents of criminal enterprises; and the polarizing forces in local communities and regions of PGMs. Taken together, the presence of PGMs may tend to make a conflict last longer, produce increased levels of violence and abuse and make the post-conflict period more volatile. This report builds upon original field research on three PGMs used in government-led counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategies: Nigeria's Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) and Somalia's darwish forces, amongst others. It also draws from earlier commissioned fieldwork for UNU-CPR's The Limits of Punishment project, involving the same three countries.

156 p. : charts, graphs, tables

Includes bibliographical references

9789280865134