

THE STATE OF
WORLD POPULATION
1993




UNFPA

United Nations
Population Fund

DR. NAJIS SADIQ
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The Individual and the World: Population, Migration and Development in the 1990s

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OF WORLD
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Summary

Families and households form the basis for economic growth, social development and personal fulfilment.

Decisions by individual women and men on marriage, family, a place to live, shape the destinies of communities and nations. National policies and international conditions provide the context for individual decision-making. Effective development policies, including population, reproductive health and family planning policies, address this reality.



UNICEF/A. Isaac

Policy-making should respond to the needs and aspirations of individuals, says the *State of World Population Report*.

Data on national and global population trends set the agenda for national policy. An important element of population programmes is gathering data that will allow policy-making responsive to the realities of daily life, and to the needs and aspirations of individuals.

The dominant feature of global demographics is still growth. Age distribution is a growing concern, as the numbers of young and elderly people grow, relative to the working-age population.

The world is growing steadily more ur-

ban. From being a sign of strength and dynamism in the national economy, the rate and scale of urban growth has become increasingly a cause for concern. The influx of migrants to the biggest cities may be weakening both urban and rural sectors.

International migration is small in extent compared with internal movements, but has a disproportionate impact. Both internal and international migration are driven by population growth, and by inequities between countries.

Migration is one of the choices which shape people's lives and the destiny of nations. But it can also be a symptom of inequity and underdevelopment. Migrants are by definition the most vulnerable members of the host community. Their living and working conditions should be protected. Governments of host countries have a responsibility to encourage adaptation among the local community.

Open and frank exchange of information and views between host and sending countries is needed more than ever. The aim of the international community should be to protect the right to move, but to ensure that movement is voluntary and that it stimulates rather than holds back personal and national development. "The point of departure should be the human right to live and work where one pleases, so long as it does not infringe on other people's rights to do the same."

The Urban Transformation

The rural sector is declining in importance and its contribution to national economies. It is increasingly part of a unified economy based on the city. Contact with the urban areas is easier than ever and is encouraged by rural development.

Temporary and circular migration is giving way to more permanent settlement. The largest cities are under increasing strain, and residents are encountering increasing difficulties in improving or even maintaining living conditions. Nevertheless, migration continues, driven by a variety of forces both positive and negative. The choice to move can be part of a strategy for survival or personal development; but it is often enforced by external conditions.

The urban transformation is irreversible, but the rural sector must also be strengthened to balance the developing economy. Attention to gender issues will be crucial in ensuring a successful transition.

The forces driving internal and international migration have much in common. Demographic pressures are contributing to both. As the pressures encouraging migration increase, the options for migrants become more limited. This collision is contributing to the atmosphere of crisis surrounding both urban and international migration.

International Migration

The impact of international migration is far greater than the figures suggest: numbers are substantially greater than reported; migrants are often in the peak years of fertility; migrants tend to concentrate in a few areas, increasing their visibility and the perception of cultural differences; and the economic integration of migrants is not matched by their social integration in the host society.

Patterns of international migration differ from region to region. Europe received 15 million migrants between 1980 and 1992, mainly for permanent settlement. The oil-producing countries have drawn migrant labour from middle eastern and Asian countries in different waves since the 1960s. Asia's migration patterns are undergoing a transformation with the emergence of a need for labour and skills in the newly industrial economies of east and south east Asia, and the changing composition of the Japanese labour force. Africa's migration patterns vary from region to region, featuring a large volume of informal transfers in west Africa and gravitation towards South Africa in the southern part of the continent. In north Africa, the dominant trend is emigration to Europe. Migration patterns in central America and the Caribbean are dominated by movement to the United States, but Brazil and Venezuela have also acted as magnets for migrants at different times. An emerging concern is movement from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to western Europe and north America.

In these countries the "migrant profile" has changed significantly from the 1960s, when flows were dominated by skilled and professional workers. Family unification has been a major influence on the composition of flows in recent years. Increasing numbers of women and undocumented

migrants have raised the proportion of unskilled workers.

Costs and Benefits

Migration is the result of individual or family decisions. But it is also part of a social process. In economic terms, migration is as much a global phenomenon as trade in commodities or manufactured goods. It is part of a broader pattern, and evidence of changing economic, social and cultural relationships.

But migration may be evidence of a different kind of relationship: the combination of poverty, rapid population growth and environmental damage is a powerful destabilizing factor driving urban growth and eventually international migration. This is most marked in Africa, but can also be seen in south Asia and some Latin American countries. It is evidence of destructive forces at work in the national and global economy and society.

On the recipient side, migration has usually been seen as evidence of a thriving economy: today's industrial states were built in part by migrant labour, skills and investment. In today's increasingly uncertain conditions, migration may be seen as a threat to the security and well-being of the local workforce and society at large.

Remittances from workers overseas are worth some \$66 billion, second in value only to oil in world trade — yet they are of mixed value to the sending societies. Migration has a considerable impact on those who stay behind, especially women, on whom much of the burden falls.

The only effective means to reduce migration pressures over the long term are to slow population growth; to stimulate economic growth and job creation at home, and promote the development of the individual and the family as the basic economic and social unit.

A Question of Gender

It is often assumed that most migrants are men. In reality, women make up nearly half of the international migrant population. Gender differences in social and economic roles affect migration decision-making, household strategy, and the sex composition of labour migration. Attention to the gender dimension of migratory

movements ought to be an important component in population and development planning.

Women frequently take the initiative in migration decisions, which may reflect limited opportunities in rural areas. Low status limits women's choices at home and may increase pressure to migrate, but it may also affect life in the host community. Opportunities may be limited by lack of education or skills, or by customary limitations on women's freedom of action outside the family or ethnic group. Paid employment for migrant women is usually in the lowest wage, least secure, and lowest status jobs, mostly in housework, child care and trade.

Most educated women end up in the same low-status, low-wage production and service jobs as unskilled female migrants. Men too experience downward mobility, but the contrast in the decline in women's employment status is far greater.

Despite these disadvantages women migrants have become significant economic actors. Their status may be improved by migration, but the advantages are not clear-cut. Women's status as migrants is affected by their vulnerability, and by their lack of reproductive freedom. To ensure improved status they will need both legal protection and essential services, including reproductive health services.

Refugees

Refugees in the 1990s are overwhelmingly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Their numbers are large, about 17 million, and growing rapidly. A further 3.5 to 4 million were thought to be in "refugee-like situations," though estimates are probably extremely conservative, and an estimated 23 million people internally displaced.

It is important to recognize the common roots of refugee and other forms of mass movement of populations. At the same time, despite the difficulty of distinguishing between political and socio-economic causes of migration, there is a clear need to distinguish between refugees and other groups of migrants.

Participation in international efforts of burden-sharing would ensure that most refugee problems would be dealt with in their regions of origin.

Conclusions and Policies

Migration highlights linkages and interdependencies within countries and between different groups of countries, with many implications for development agendas, including population programmes and development assistance.

Policies to regulate or moderate internal migration have concentrated largely on urban growth. They have been only intermittently effective. The most successful have concentrated on stimulating rural development and the growth of alternative urban centres.

Migration is also a personal or family decision, which is affected by external conditions such as poverty or environmental degradation. Improving conditions of personal and family life can make a crucial difference in the decision to migrate, reducing dependence on migration as a strategy.

This offers the opportunity for policies emphasizing individual development, among them education, health (including reproductive health) and family planning. Such policies are particularly relevant to the situation of women in many countries. Strategies must take into account gender differences in social and economic life and the differential effects of policies.

Migration decisions are about family security and long-term life-chances, rather than simply the maximization of income. They are ultimately strategies designed to look after the individual's and the household's needs, safeguard their security, and respond to their aspirations. If the goal is to reduce migration pressures through development it will be essential to increase the capacity but reduce the need to migrate.

Long-term external support will be required to make such policies a reality, particularly in areas of rapid population growth and potential mass outward flows.

Highly coordinated allocation of development assistance can help establish priorities and focus attention on basic needs. The challenge to both international donors and co-operating governments is to direct programme spending to the areas where it can be most effective.

1. The Demographic Background¹

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Population Growth

Growth and Geography

The worldwide rate of population growth has been essentially the same since 1975, at about 1.7 per cent a year. Fertility is actually going down slightly, from 3.8 in 1975-1980 to 3.3 in 1990-1995. Because of past growth, however, the number of people added each year is still rising. In 1975, the annual addition was about 72 million. In 1992 it was 93 million. It will peak between 1995 and 2000, at about 98 million annually.

Rapid population growth is therefore still the dominant feature of global demographics, and will continue to be so for at least the next 30 years. The 1993 global population of 5.57 billion is projected to increase to 6.25 billion in 2000, 8.5 billion in 2025 and 10 billion in 2050; significant growth will probably continue until about 2150 and a level of about 11.6 billion.

The developing countries' proportion of this increase grew from 77 per cent in 1950 to 93 per cent in 1990; between now and the end of the century it will be 95 per cent. Africa and south Asia alone account for 53 per cent.²

Asia's population in mid-1993 is 3.3 billion. By 2025, Asia will have 4.9 billion people, equal to the whole of world population in 1986; Africa (700 million) will have 1.6 billion; Latin America (466 million) will have 700 million people.

This overall picture conceals wide variations from country to country and region to region. For example:

- Annual growth 1990-1995 is estimated at 3.0 per cent for Africa, with Asia at 1.9 per cent and Latin America 2.1 per cent. By and large the fastest rates of growth are in the poorest countries;
- The 47 countries officially designated by the United Nations as "least developed" accounted for 7 per cent of global increase in 1950, but 13 per cent by 1990;

- Life expectancy has increased by 30 years in east Asia over the last four decades, as against 15 years in Africa, which has 30 of the 47 "least developed" countries;

ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION BY SIZE BY REGION, 1950-2025

Region	Population (millions)				
	1950	1970	1990	2000	2025
World Total	2,516 (100.0)	3,698 (100.0)	5,292 100.0	6,251 100.0	8,504 100.0
Industrialized countries	832 (33.1)	1,049 (28.4)	1,207 (22.8)	1,264 (20.2)	1,354 (15.9)
Developing countries	1,684 (66.9)	2,649 (71.6)	4,086 (77.2)	4,987 (79.8)	7,150 (84.1)
Africa	222 (8.8)	362 (9.8)	642 (12.1)	967 (15.5)	1,597 (18.8)
North America	166 (6.6)	226 (6.1)	276 (5.2)	295 (4.7)	332 (3.9)
Latin America	186 (7.4)	286 (7.7)	446 (8.5)	538 (8.6)	757 (8.9)
Asia	1,377 (54.7)	2,102 (56.8)	3,113 (58.8)	3,713 (59.2)	4,912 (57.8)
Europe	393 (15.6)	460 (12.4)	498 (9.4)	510 (8.1)	515 (6.1)
Oceania	13 (0.5)	19 (0.5)	26 (0.5)	30 (0.5)	36 (0.4)
U.S.S.R.	180 (7.2)	243 (6.6)	269 (5.1)	308 (4.9)	352 (4.1)

Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects 1990 (United Nations, New York 1991).

- Fertility has fallen by 60 per cent in east Asia in the same period, but by only 25 per cent in south Asia and hardly at all in Africa.









- Maternal mortality has been halved in east Asia, but remains virtually unchanged in south Asia and Africa.

Among developing countries, the lowest growth rates are in east Asia and the Caribbean (1.3 per cent). East Asia's growth rates largely reflect the situation in China, which is 85 per cent of the region. Central and south America, south-east and

The Demographic Background



Age Distribution
Estimates and projections of proportion of population by major area and region (percentage)



south Asia, and southern Africa lie between 2 and 2.5 per cent; north Africa and west Asia between 2.5 and 3; and the rest of Africa over 3 per cent.

The biggest variation of all has grown up between the industrialized countries of Europe and north America, and the rest of the world. In the industrialized countries, population growth has slowed or stopped altogether, and fertility is at or below replacement level. Their populations increased by 43 per cent between 1950 and 1990, compared with 162 per cent among the least developed countries and 140 per cent in the other developing countries. This variation will deepen: the populations of Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, roughly the same in 1985 at about 480 million, will be 500 million and 1500 million respectively by 2025.

Asia has 59 per cent of world population, Latin America 9 per cent and Africa 12 per cent. Africa's share is projected to go up to 19 per cent by 2025, while proportions in the other regions remain about the same. Within Asia the proportions are changing: China, now 37 per cent of Asia's population, will be 31 per cent by 2025; India will go from 27 per cent to 29 per cent.

Growth and Age Structures

A younger world...

The perception that the world is getting younger is only partly accurate. The proportion of world population under the age of 15, while it increased from 35 per cent in 1950 to 38 per cent in 1965, then decreased to 32 per cent in 1990. But there are far more young people in the population: 1.7 billion in 1990 as against 700 million in 1950.

There are wide regional variations: in east, middle and west Africa, where fertility has stayed high and the proportion of under-15s has stayed at about 40 per cent, their numbers have risen from 89 million in 1950 to 281 million today. The proportion in Latin America peaked in 1965-1970 at over 40 per cent and has been falling rapidly since then. The proportion of under-15s has been falling all over Asia, but much more rapidly in east Asia, where it is now about 26 per cent (or 366 million). In south Asia, by comparison, it is still about

Source: See page 1.

The Demographic Background

39 per cent—some 496 million young people under the age of 15 (see graph).

...Or an older one?

In countries where fertility was already low by 1950 (Europe, north America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) the proportion of over-65s will jump from 12 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent in 2010 and 19 per cent in 2025. By that time, 3.2 per cent of the population in these countries will be over 75.

But some Asian and Latin American countries will also see rapid rises in the over-65 populations, notably those like China, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico or Thailand where fertility fell rapidly between 1950 and 1990. In these countries, the proportion of over-65s will double, from 5 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2025. By that time it will be accelerating, suggesting it will grow further and probably faster after 2025.

There will be more older women than older men: the increases between 1990 and 2025 are projected to be 53 million males

and 58 million females in the industrialized countries, and 180 million males and 209 females in the rest of the world.


The Effect of AIDS

The WHO Global Programme on AIDS reports that about 2.5 million cases of AIDS have occurred. Approximately 13 million men, women and children had been infected with the AIDS virus HIV from the start of the pandemic to January 1993. There were an estimated 1 million new infections in the second half of 1992, the majority in south and south-east Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa. WHO estimates that there will be 40 million infections by the end of the century, and perhaps a million deaths a year.

Africa has had over 7.5 million HIV infections, the Americas over 2 million, south and south-east Asia over 1.5 million, western Europe about 500,000, north Africa and the Middle East about 75,000, eastern Europe and central Asia about



**World Population Growth:
Annual Growth Rates and Increments**



Source: See page 1.

The Demographic Background

WORLD'S 20 LARGEST URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS, RANKED BY POPULATION SIZE IN MILLIONS, 1950-2000

1950			
Rank	Agglomeration	Country	Population (millions)
1	NEW YORK	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	12.3
2	LONDON	UNITED KINGDOM	8.7
3	TOKYO	JAPAN	6.7
4	PARIS	FRANCE	5.4
5	SHANGHAI	CHINA	5.3
6	BUENOS AIRES	ARGENTINA	5.0
7	CHICAGO	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	4.9
8	MOSCOW	USSR	4.8
9	CALCUTTA	INDIA	4.4
10	LOS ANGELES	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	4.0
11	BEIJING	CHINA	3.9
12	OSAKA	JAPAN	3.8
13	MILAN	ITALY	3.6
14	MEXICO CITY	MEXICO	3.1
15	PHILADELPHIA	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	2.9
16	BOMBAY	INDIA	2.9
17	RIO DE JANEIRO	BRAZIL	2.9
18	DETROIT	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	2.8
19	NAPLES	ITALY	2.8
20	LENINGRAD	USSR	2.6

1970			
Rank	Agglomeration	Country	Population (millions)
1	NEW YORK	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	16.2
2	TOKYO	JAPAN	14.9
3	SHANGHAI	CHINA	11.2
4	MEXICO CITY	MEXICO	9.4
5	LONDON	UNITED KINGDOM	8.6
6	BUENOS AIRES	ARGENTINA	8.4
7	LOS ANGELES	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	8.4
8	PARIS	FRANCE	8.3
9	BEIJING	CHINA	8.1
10	SAO PAULO	BRAZIL	8.1
11	OSAKA	JAPAN	7.6
12	MOSCOW	USSR	7.1
13	RIO DE JANEIRO	BRAZIL	7.0
14	CALCUTTA	INDIA	6.9
15	CHICAGO	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	6.7
16	BOMBAY	INDIA	5.8
17	MILAN	ITALY	5.5
18	CAIRO	EGYPT	5.3
19	SEOUL	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	5.3
20	TIANJIN	CHINA	5.2

1990			
Rank	Agglomeration	Country	Population (millions)
1	MEXICO CITY	MEXICO	20.2
2	TOKYO	JAPAN	18.1
3	SAO PAULO	BRAZIL	17.4
4	NEW YORK	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	16.2
5	SHANGHAI	CHINA	13.4
6	LOS ANGELES	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	11.9
7	CALCUTTA	INDIA	11.8
8	BUENOS AIRES	ARGENTINA	11.5
9	BOMBAY	INDIA	11.2
10	SEOUL	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	11.0
11	BEIJING	CHINA	10.8
12	RIO DE JANEIRO	BRAZIL	10.7
13	TIANJIN	CHINA	9.4
14	JAKARTA	INDONESIA	9.3
15	CAIRO	EGYPT	9.0
16	MOSCOW	USSR	8.8
17	DELHI	INDIA	8.8
18	OSAKA	JAPAN	8.5
19	PARIS	FRANCE	8.5
20	METRO MANILA	PHILIPPINES	8.5

2000			
Rank	Agglomeration	Country	Population (millions)
1	MEXICO CITY	MEXICO	25.6
2	SAO PAULO	BRAZIL	22.1
3	TOKYO	JAPAN	19.0
4	SHANGHAI	CHINA	17.0
5	NEW YORK	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	16.8
6	CALCUTTA	INDIA	15.7
7	BOMBAY	INDIA	15.4
8	BEIJING	CHINA	14.0
9	LOS ANGELES	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	13.9
10	JAKARTA	INDONESIA	13.7
11	DELHI	INDIA	13.2
12	BUENOS AIRES	ARGENTINA	12.9
13	LAGOS	NIGERIA	12.9
14	TIANJIN	CHINA	12.7
15	SEOUL	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	12.7
16	RIO DE JANEIRO	BRAZIL	12.5
17	DHAKA	BANGLADESH	12.2
18	CAIRO	EGYPT	11.8
19	METRO MANILA	PHILIPPINES	11.8
20	KARACHI	PAKISTAN	11.7

Source: UN Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects 1990.

50,000, east Asia and the Pacific about 25,000 and Australasia about 25,000.

The seriousness of the AIDS pandemic is not confined to the death toll, which by the end of the century will be approximately the same as that of malaria. It has disproportionate effects on already weakened economies and weakened family structures in developing countries. AIDS strikes at men and women fairly equally.

In Africa the destabilizing effect of AIDS is reported as one cause of urban migration. AIDS itself is unlikely to have a serious long-term demographic effect: the United Nations estimated that in a hypothetical worst case, that is if the whole of Africa were affected on the same scale as the worst known affected areas, Africa's population growth rate would still be about 1.8 per cent by the end of the century. The threat of AIDS may encourage the use of condoms, which may have its own effect on fertility.³ On the other hand, AIDS contributes to social instability, insecurity and poverty—conditions which typically accompany high fertility.

Growth and the Cities

Urban Growth

The world is steadily becoming more urban. In 1950, 83 per cent of the developing world's population lived in rural areas. By 1975, rural areas still accounted for nearly 75 per cent of the population; by the end of the present decade, it is expected that this will be down to 60 per cent. By the early decades of the next century, more than half of the world's people will live in cities.

By the year 2000, the 125 cities in developing countries with more than one million people will increase to some 300. In Africa alone, the least urbanized continent, there are now 37 such cities, as compared with only two in 1950. With annual population growth of some 6 per cent in many African cities, they will double in size every 12 years. Over the 1990s no less than 83 per cent of the world's population increase is expected to take place in towns and cities—81 million people every year, equivalent to around ten extra cities the size of Moscow, Delhi, Paris or Lagos. The increase in urban populations will continue going up even after annual additions to overall world population have started

to decline, reaching 95.5 million per year between 2020 and 2025.

A third of the world's urban population live in cities of more than 1 million inhabitants. A phenomenon of the last 20 years is the growth of "megacities" in developing countries. In 1950, seven of the ten largest metropolitan areas were in the developed world, and none exceeded a population of 15 million. By the end of the 1990s, eight will be in the developing world, and all will have populations in excess of 15 million. Concentration of urban populations in megacities is striking: more than 30 per cent of the urban population live in the capital cities of Argentina, Bangladesh, Egypt, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and Thailand.

The transition from predominantly rural to predominantly urban populations is common to all industrial societies, and it is the assumption underlying nearly all national development plans. However, while urban growth in many developing countries continues at an unprecedented rate, the cities' capacity to provide economic opportunities and even modest levels of support services to newcomers is declining rather than increasing. At this point, even medium-sized urban centres experience difficulties in providing for ever growing populations. A survey of 128 cities undertaken by the Asian Urban Information Center of Kobe, Japan, found that 83 per cent of city governments perceived the influx of people as a problem for urban management.⁴

The rate of national population growth has a strong impact on urban growth. A study of 97 developing countries for the 1992 *State of World Population* Report found that, in the 48 countries with faster national population growth, urban areas were growing at an average of 6.1 per cent a year. In the 49 countries with slower overall population growth, cities were growing at only 3.6 per cent a year.⁵

Rural Growth

High fertility is a characteristic of poor and rural populations, and until the 1950s it was accompanied by correspondingly high infant and child mortality. The "population explosion" was in the first place the result of a humanitarian triumph, as more children survived. But continuing poverty

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and continuing high fertility are stealing the victory from the next generation.

Movement from rural areas accounts for about 60 per cent of urban growth in the developing world.⁶ Because of the exodus to the city, rural areas in some countries are actually suffering from a shortage rather than a surplus of working-age population. Yet rural population growth continues, in Africa at about 2 per cent a year and in Asia at about 1.4 per cent.

More rural people move to other rural areas than to the cities. These shifts may be made for environmental reasons, as land becomes useless for agriculture, or they may be for economic reasons, as more good land is taken in for cash crops.

Rural areas have not been the focus of development policies; yet with a substantial proportion of populations still in rural areas, and the growing inability of urban

areas to house, feed, and employ urban migrants, rural development becomes an imperative.

Successful national development policies respond directly to the needs of individuals, wherever they are. Providing reproductive health and family planning services, especially for women and the rural poor, will promote economic development and help reduce the need to migrate.

Growth and International Migration

Population increase also helps to drive international migration. The countries producing most international migrants—for example Mexico, Turkey and Morocco—have relatively moderate rates of population growth, and analysis of population movements over the past 30 years suggests that, while the current rate of population growth is important, it is not decisive in determining the rate of international migration.⁷ Past rapid growth however may well have a decisive effect on current migratory trends as new and larger age cohorts move into the workforce.


And, though *rates* of population growth may have fallen in most developing countries, *numbers* are rapidly increasing. The rapid increase in the number of young people entering their peak years of fertility has the potential for even greater increases in the future. Every demographic impetus towards migration will be multiplied over the next two or three decades as populations—and therefore the number of potential migrants—rise. The combination of population pressures and economic imbalances could produce mass migration from poorer to richer countries⁸

International migration policies have rarely been adopted for demographic reasons, and the area of international migration has until recently been treated as peripheral to population policy. But international migration has been and still is a key element in the transfer of skills, the supply of labour and the relief of demographic or social pressures.

Population Distribution

The scale and diversity of today's migrations are beyond any previous experience. Responses to the questions they raise will help to determine the course of the 21st century.

▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
Population Projections by Region (medium variant)



The medium variant is considered the most likely.
Source: United Nations Population Division. *Long Range World Population Projections*, New York, 1992.

Internal

Most development policies are based on the assumption of industrialization and therefore urbanization. Yet most countries remain unhappy with the internal distribution of their populations. There has been little success in moderating the rate or nature of urban growth, and concern is rising that cities are becoming a brake rather than a stimulus to development.

The economies of many developing countries are ill-equipped to support urban growth on its present scale. The urban population of the industrialized countries increased five times between 1840 and 1914, the period of most rapid industrialization. By contrast, the urban population of the developing world is expected to increase by approximately 16 times between 1950 and 2025.⁹ The slower pace of change in the industrialized countries—though it carried its share of social disruption and misery—allowed the gradual building of institutional structures to deal with and support the transformation. In today's developing countries, rapid growth is compressed into a much smaller time-frame, without the capital investment necessary to build appropriate structures.

The debate about migration must factor in the large numbers of people who will be forced to move as a result of environmental change. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "environmental degradation is increasingly a cause of population movements ... [that] has long been overlooked."¹⁰ Of the estimated 1 billion poor people in developing regions, some 450 million live in low-potential agricultural areas. A similar number live in ecologically vulnerable areas susceptible to soil erosion, floods and other environmental hazards.¹¹ These "critical zones" cannot sustain current inhabitants, let alone future additions.

Global warming is expected to make certain islands, coastal areas and river deltas uninhabitable because of rising sea levels. This alone could turn some 16 per cent of Egypt's population and 10 per cent of Bangladeshis into environmental refugees.¹² The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the "Earth Summit") in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 called attention to the scale of these possibilities: early and determined action

along the lines of the strategies for sustainable development (Agenda 21) adopted at Rio will be needed if human and ecological catastrophe are to be prevented.

International

In 1989, the United Nations estimated that some 50 million people, or 1 per cent of world population, lived in a country other than their country of origin. In 1992, the World Bank estimated international migrants of all kinds at 100 million.¹³

Refugees in 1991 totalled approximately 17 million, 87 per cent of them in developing countries.¹⁴ Of the remaining international migrants, some 35 million were in sub-Saharan Africa, with 13-15 million each in western Europe and north America. A further 15 million are in Asia and the Middle East, where a few countries have particularly heavy migrant concentrations.

International migration is on a far smaller scale than the urban transformation. Yet its impact is out of proportion to the numbers involved. Migration is the visible face of social change. It is a face which is often greeted with apprehension. In the industrialized countries, and in many developing countries, immigration has become a political issue. "There is no doubt that a serious reappraisal of the whole issue of international migration and its implications for national and regional stability is under way, though the process is more visible in the industrialized states."¹⁵ To quote a recent inter-governmental discussion document (1992), "migration is now seen as a priority issue equal in political weight to other major global challenges such as the environment, population growth and economic imbalances between regions."¹⁶

In the past three years, high-level meetings from the G7 to the OECD Ministerial Council (June 1991) and the EC Summit (Maastricht, December 1991), have dealt with the topic. There are also increasing calls for international collaboration on control mechanisms and other policy initiatives to ensure that problems in coping with asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants are not passed from one receiving country to another.

Meanwhile, African, Asian and Latin American economies and societies are feeling the effects, good and bad, of a radical



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redistribution of their populations towards the urban areas, and increasingly, of migration beyond their borders.

Some developing countries are relying on international migration to finance development; the value of remittances is \$66 billion (1989), second only to oil in its value in international trade, and more than international development assistance (\$46 billion). But it is not clear that economic benefits match the size of the flows: migration draws off the skills and energy of the young, the talented, and the better educated. More study is needed of the social and economic effects of international migration.

A Need for Equity

Between 1950 and today per capita income in the rich countries has almost

tripled, while in the poorer countries there has been no improvement.¹⁷ Tariff and other barriers have held back developing countries' efforts to expand their share of world trade, while debt and interest repayment have more than offset economic assistance. Misconceived development priorities starve the social sector—notably education and health—and hold back economic growth in the next generation.

In the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America 2.3 people of working age support each school-age child, compared to 4.1 in the industrialized countries. The rapidly increasing numbers of young people seeking employment should lower the burden of dependency, but there are far more young people than jobs. With 36 per cent of the population under 15 years of age, the labour force in the

Alternative Futures

Population projections are not predictions. They make certain explicit assumptions, notably that fertility will fall during the 1990s and continue to fall. Implicit are two further assumptions:

- that the will and the means are available to create the conditions for slower, more balanced population growth; and
- that progress will not be impeded by external factors.

The perception that slower population growth is associated with faster development is not now seriously challenged. Between 1950 and 1990, the industrialized countries almost tripled their income per head, while real income in the developing countries remained unchanged. On the other hand, developing countries that have been successful economically have also made the most determined efforts to slow population growth—investing in social development, including population and reproductive health programmes and programmes for improving the status of women.

In the 1980s, there was a marked correlation in developing countries between slower population growth and better economic performance: it is also noticeable that among the good economic performers of earlier decades, those with slower population growth in the earlier period did better economically in the 1980s. The best-known examples are in south-east and east Asia, but Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Mauritius and Mexico show some of the same characteristics.

Demand for family planning services has risen rapidly in developing countries. The use of contraception rose from 10 per cent in 1960 to over 50 per cent in 1990. An estimated 100 million additional women would use modern contraception if it were available.

Some low-income countries like Sri Lanka and the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu in India have also achieved low fertility, and at the same time have improved non-economic indicators of the quality of life, such as literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy. These societies have in common an approach to development which includes universal access to education, health and family planning, combined with relative equality in status, employment opportunities and full political rights for women.

developing world will grow by 38 million a year during the 1990s.¹⁸ In Mexico alone, a million people enter the workforce annually. In the United States, with a population almost three times greater and an economy almost 30 times larger, the annual addition is only 2 million.¹⁹

Additions to the labour force in developing countries, 732 million over the next 20 years, will exceed the entire 1990 labour force of the industrialized countries of 686 million—but exploitation of this growing resource, with all its potential, calls for adequate flows of capital for investment and technology transfers.


Failing that, the combination of large increases in population, particularly urban population, excess of labour supply over available jobs, rising social and therefore political turbulence, and persistent or worsening inequalities between richer and poorer countries, will inevitably stimulate migration in search for better living conditions.

The aspirations for a better life that drive the movements of people cannot be solved by development assistance alone. Nor can they be solved by mass migration. Global sustainable development implies a long-term commitment to greater equity in access to resources and productive assets. It requires above all a genuinely global approach to reducing both poverty and population growth.

Individual Development as a Policy Option

The linked questions of urban growth and migration across national borders offer a challenge to the international political system to agree on common agendas for action in many interconnected areas, including trade, debt, the environment and population, and to find the political will and resources to support whatever policies are agreed. Coherent internationally agreed policies concerning migration will be an important part of the framework of sustainable development.

Efforts to address international migration must ensure respect and support for existing communities of the foreign-born, allowing them to integrate more closely with the surrounding society. The rights and responsibilities of sending and host



countries, and of individual migrants, need to be clearly stated.

At the global level, there is no short cut: policies and mechanisms are needed to enable people to live in dignity in their own countries, and to make migration a real choice between opportunities. Attention to the individual dimension of development, in particular the contributions and interests of women, will be a key element of any such policies.

The continued low status of women denies their human rights and their autonomy, and limits their income. Migration is transforming household structures in a way that increasingly leaves women with sole responsibility for dependent children and the elderly. Male migration affects women by leaving them with responsibility for home, family and income. Nearly half of all migrants are women, many of whom are heads of households. Development in the 1990s calls for decisive interventions to raise the status of women, along with investments in education, nutrition, health care and family planning.

These investments help contribute to lower fertility, to economic growth and social balance. They help to create an atmosphere in which migration becomes one choice among many. They increase the capacity to migrate while reducing the need to do so.

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Such policies and programmes will take a generation or more to have their full effect. But because they affect directly many areas of individual, family and community life, they will have an immediate impact. The perception that the international community and government, at all levels, were committed to real change would help stimulate a positive response.

The Will and the Means

The number of countries reporting concern with rates of population growth has risen dramatically in recent years. According to the Sixth Population Inquiry among governments, conducted in 1990, some 90 per cent of the peoples of developing countries live under governments committed to reducing the rate of population growth.

The same inquiry shows that many countries are seriously concerned with rural-urban migration and concentration of population in urban areas, especially in metropolitan areas. In fact, more than half of governments responding to the survey had policies to decrease migration into

metropolitan areas. Some 70 per cent of the countries participating in the survey responded that their population distribution pattern required either major or minor changes.²⁰

Rapid population growth in the past, a high ratio of dependents to workers and declining real incomes mean both less consumption and less ability to save—and therefore fewer jobs. Breaking the vicious circle will depend on fertility in the next generation. In the meantime, young, educated and mobile people will find work wherever they can. The existence of family and community networks in urban areas and in more affluent countries make the migration decision easier.

Concern with migration extends from developing countries faced with bursting cities and a neglected rural sector, to industrialized countries, faced with the potential for an uncontrollable tide of people from poorer countries. The linked issues of migration, population and development are the subject of the following chapters.

2. The Country and the City

Today, even in the least developed countries, rural populations are part of the modern state, taxed, conscripted, and, to a greater or lesser extent, brought into the modern labour force. TV, radio and easier travel expose them to wider horizons and images of other futures.¹ They depend on urban centres to buy and sell goods and services. In many important ways, they are becoming part of the urban world.

At the same time the cities still depend on the rural sector. Agriculture makes a diminishing contribution to the national economy in developing countries, but it remains the most important source of livelihood and survival, especially in the poorest countries. In 1965, agriculture accounted for 41 per cent of gross domestic product in low income countries and 77 per cent of employment. By 1985, the contribution to GDP had fallen to 32 per cent, but the employment level remained nearly as high as before, at 72 per cent. In low middle income countries too, in 1985, agriculture still provided employment for 55 per cent of the population.²

In sub-Saharan Africa in 1985-90 agriculture accounted for 58 per cent of employment in Botswana, 79 per cent in Cameroon, 87 per cent in Malawi and 71 per cent in Zimbabwe. In the Americas, in Haiti, Honduras, Bolivia, Guatemala and Jamaica, the figures for the same period are around or above 50 per cent. The same was true in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in Asia. No equivalent figures are available for China or for India, but the data for 1975-80 indicated that agricultural employment levels were at 71 per cent and 74 per cent, respectively.³

While agriculture has contributed less to the economy, population growth has meant a steady increase in the number of people dependent on agriculture for a living. Between 1965 and 1985 numbers rose from 220 to 310 million in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Asia from 1350 millions to 1675 millions.⁴ While this process is tailing

off in Asia, the rural populations of Africa will continue to increase.

Development policies favouring urban and export markets and their suppliers—large farmers with access to credit and high technology—have reduced the incomes of small farmers and increased the number of landless labourers, increasing poverty and disrupting the social and economic relationships that hold rural society together. One effect has been to reinforce the attractions of the city for poor rural people.⁵ The 1980s saw some effort to redress the balance in favour of the rural sector. But higher prices for food producers did not necessarily improve the lot of small farmers, who lacked access to capital and credit.

At the same time, the rising price of food has increased the numbers of the urban poor. In the poorest countries, rapid levels of urban growth, from natural increase as well as in-migration, now coincide with continuing high fertility in the countryside.

Rural poverty, high fertility and environmental degradation continue to drive some 20-30 million of the world's poorest people annually to the towns and cities.⁶ According to the 1980 census, the majority of migrants to Mexico City left homes in the country's poorest regions.

By the year 2000, some 90 per cent of the absolute poor in Latin America and the Caribbean will be city-dwellers, along with 40 per cent in Africa and 45 per cent in Asia. World Bank estimates suggest that by 2000 the number of urban households living in conditions of poverty will have more than doubled from 1975 levels of 33.5 million persons to some 74.3 million.

With each passing year the social and communal networks linking rural settlements with the cities grow stronger. Rural-urban migration becomes easier and the risks lower and easier to take in the face of rural decline.

Migration and the Environment

The causes of environmental disruption have been divided into six categories: elemental, biological, slow-onset and accidental disruptions; disruptions caused by development, and environmental warfare.⁷

For purposes of this report, particular attention will be given to three of the six categories.

Elemental Disruptions includes all "natural causes" of disasters, such as cyclones, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, floods and tidal waves.

Biological Disruptions are less threatening today than earlier in the century, as a result of the introduction of pesticides, insecticides and monitoring programmes. But they may combine with other causes.

Slow-onset disruptions are the result of interaction among human and ecological forces over extended periods. Global warming, deforestation, land degradation, soil erosion, salinity, siltation of waterways, waterlogging of pastoral land and desertification are among the most prominent of the processes which fall into this category.

Slow-onset disruptions are the primary cause of population movement. Migration may increase gradually as conditions deteriorate; alternatively, emergencies can develop, resulting in mass exodus from the affected area. Desertification and gradual soil deterioration, in combination with civil conflict and a refusal of the governing authorities to allow food and essential supplies to reach many of those most in need has resulted in famine in the Horn of Africa on several occasions in recent years. In Southern Thailand, in the 1980s, logging removed cover and brush from mountainsides. With the onset of severe storms in 1988, serious mud-slides occurred, killing hundreds and causing thousands to move.

In Africa, water scarcity is a major contributor to environmental stress. Population growth plus increased *per capita* water use have strained national capacity. Falkenmark calculates that as much as two-thirds of the African population may be living in "water-stressed countries" by the end of the century. This will severely limit the population carrying capacity of the countries concerned.⁸ Without substantial progress to alleviate poverty and reduce rates of population increase, high levels of out-migration seem inevitable.

Continuing high levels of population growth in poor regions intensify ecological deterioration. Necessity dictates short-term decisions for survival, for example using "slash and burn" techniques on ecologically fragile hillsides, rather than considering the long-term need for sustainability.⁹

Efforts to alleviate poverty should not put development before environmental considerations.¹⁰ The practice is self-defeating and increases the likelihood of future disasters and larger migrations.

Circular and Temporary Migration

Temporary or circular migration has been a common feature of rural-urban population movement in many parts of the world. Employers can recruit migrant workers at low wages and save money on facilities and support services, although this is offset by high labour turnover. Temporary migrants maintain their roots in the countryside. In many cases, subsistence farmers move to the city on a seasonal basis, seeking to supplement their income. However, wages are not sufficient to support the family, so spouses and children are likely to remain at home.

Circular migration may involve absences of a few months or several years. However, absence of more than a year seems to be an exception.

Although patterns of this kind persist, notably in Latin America, parts of south-east Asia and west Africa, circular migration is becoming less common as jobs in the city are harder to obtain. With increasing unemployment, a migrant worker who gets a job has every reason to hold on to it.

Studies of migration patterns between rural communities in Maharashtra and Bombay indicate a gradual transformation from seasonal migration to longer stays, and then more or less permanent settlement. Seasonal movements were typical until the 1940s; then annual migration patterns came to predominate. This later gave way to a pattern in which a young man leaves his village in his late teens, maintains social contacts throughout his working life, and then retires to the village with his savings. African studies too demonstrate that, despite the move towards long-term migration, in many cases migrants maintain close links with the home community.¹¹

In today's more difficult economy, some rural migrants may make only one visit to the city. Successful or not, they return either to their home areas or move to a smaller (and possibly more viable) city.

Migration as a Strategy

The poverty so common in the cities of the developing world suggests that migrants' hopes have been in vain; but while many may be disappointed at first, extensive studies throughout the developing

world persistently report that a majority are satisfied with their move and consider that their condition has improved.

The decision to migrate to the city, like the decision to migrate internationally, is normally a family decision, and subject to discussion in a broader community.¹² It should be seen as part of a family strategy to minimize overall economic risk and insure against threats to household viability. Yet the decision in many cases is driven by necessity as much as choice.

With the diminishing capacity of the poorest countries, as well as many middle-low income countries, to provide services and urban infrastructure for an ever-growing population, moving to the cities will not necessarily continue to produce an improvement in migrants' living standards. Higher urban wages reflect higher productivity in urban centres, which depends on economies of scale and access to capital.¹³ The informal sector, notably in India and Latin America, has an extraordinary capacity to absorb new entrants to the labour force: but earnings are often at subsistence levels.

In Latin America and Asia, the pace of migration has slowed, and most urban growth is now accounted for by natural increase. Life for the next urban generation is likely to be more difficult than for their parents, especially in countries where urban population is concentrated in one or two primate cities, infrastructure and public services are inadequate and a large proportion of the population consists of low-income families.

In countries such as India, with many "primate cities", cities act as engines of development—yet in 1990, it was estimated that squatter families comprised 44 per cent of the population of Calcutta, 42 per cent of that of Bombay and more than 30 per cent of that of Delhi.¹⁴ In such circumstances, it is the poorest who are subject to the greatest risks from pollution, natural hazards such as flood or fire, poor sanitation and industrial contamination.¹⁵ The case of Lima, Peru (see Box) illustrates current difficulties and the phenomenon of the "unsustainable city".

Even in China, where fertility levels have declined drastically, the legacy of years of high annual population increases continues to be felt. Commercialization of

Forces Driving Rural-Urban Migration

- Population growth in rural areas exceeds the capacity of the agrarian sector to support it;
- Investment in the agrarian sector is not concentrated on labour-intensive small enterprise, but on larger-scale, capital-intensive agriculture. This leads to a reduced requirement for farm labour, and hence to extra migration to the city;
- As a result of the general urban bias of public policy, the level of commercial and non-commercial services and amenities is higher in cities than in rural areas;
- Wages in the formal sector are higher in the cities and rural areas;
- Rural development which gives particular emphasis to improvement of infrastructure (through road-building, etc.) results in increased migration to the cities, because these are now more accessible;
- Land distribution which fails to take account of traditional common rights (grazing, fishing, etc.) destroys the prospects of the landless and leads to migration to the cities.

Source: A World of Difference: A New Framework for Development Cooperation in the 1990s. The Hague: Government of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1991, p. 170.

agriculture in China and a dramatic shift from the system of former years has displaced a significant number of people from the land. Current estimates suggest that numbers of surplus workers in the countryside will increase from 150 million to 200 million by the end of the decade, as a result of a combination of economic change and the 1966-76 "baby boom".¹⁶

Already, some 60 million people from the poorer regions of rural China are working in marginal areas of the urban economy, taking on the dirty and dangerous jobs in construction, waste disposal and sweat shops that city-dwellers are unwilling to do.

Despite an array of policy measures to stimulate broad-based rural development or attract migrants to secondary cities and towns, no country has succeeded in stemming the urban tide. Indeed, continuing high rates of rural population growth have



United Nations
Population Fund

Squalid Slums Grow as People Flood Latin American Cities

LIMA, Peru — In March 1992, 600 families invaded land that had once been a garbage dump on the southern outskirts of Lima, making a settlement by building straw huts overnight. The police moved in repeatedly, evicting the families and leveling the huts but the settlers came back each time.

The invasion, like others throughout Latin America, had a predictable result: six months later, the 400-acre tract was a teeming shantytown with 10,000 residents who are lobbying the city to give each family title to its own piece of dusty ground 20 feet wide by 40 feet long.

Despite grinding poverty, Peruvians seeking a better life have been fleeing the countryside for Lima at the rate of more than a thousand a day.

"The demand in Lima for a piece of land is so great it can't be stopped," said Pedro Ublitas, general secretary of the settlement. "The authorities call us terrorists and criminals. They bring the police in and threaten us. But they don't realize we need space for our families."

In 1950, only 42 per cent of Latin Americans were city dwellers; today almost 73 per cent live in cities, according to the United Nations. This compares with 34 per cent in Africa and 33 per cent in Asia. The trend has created megacities throughout the continent, and a recognizable pattern: the major city attracts one-quarter to one-third of the country's population, with many living in squalid slums or shantytowns encircling the affluent inner city.

The migrants from the countryside have found few economic opportunities, alarming levels of pollution, uncontrollable crime, and the nearly free movement of terrorists and other violent groups.

The shantytown has organized itself for self-defence and to lobby for land titles, but its municipal services are almost nonexistent. Water is brought in barrels. Electricity comes from the few car batteries that residents manage to pick up. City authorities do not collect trash and garbage, because to do so would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of the settlement. So residents dump it by the side of the road.

Though the rate of growth of the cities has slowed, rural dwellers will continue flocking to them well into the next century, when they could hold 85 to 90 per cent of the people. The countryside then will be all but empty.

The urban sprawl is linking giant cities. Experts say that by the year 2010, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo will be one continuous megalopolis 350 miles long with almost 40 million people.

As in other nations, people flocked to this capital from the countryside in the 1950s and 1960s in search of better jobs, education and health care.

At first, jobs were plentiful. But in the 1980s Peru's Government, like other Latin American governments caught in the debt crisis and rising inflationary spiral, cut off almost all industrial growth. Investment plunged, and poverty began to rise again.

Peru had an added problem: the growing Shining Path violence in the Andean region. The peasants there were caught in the middle, with many killed by either the guerrillas or the army. This created a wave of refugees.

Now Peru, like other countries, finds that its secondary cities are exploding too. Arequipa, Ilo and Cusco are all expanding at 5 to 8 per cent a year.

"The big cities do not offer the same attractions they offered 10 years ago," said Francisco Leon, a United Nations economist. "They are saturated, so people are turning to intermediate cities, but that creates new problems. Where do you get money to provide basic services? You have many of these places that are essentially going from being small villages to complete cities in a matter of years."

The settlement continues to grow with the arrival of people like Fernando Ortiz, who stood outside his straw hut one day pulling nails out of boards that he planned to use to shore up the structure.

"In the sierras the people are very strong and alive, and you can feel it in the language," said Mrs. Ortiz. "Here in the city, a lot of that disappears."

But as her husband pointed out, that was a small price to pay. "Many of us don't have a choice," he said. "This is the best we can do right now."

resulted in the transformation of such secondary cities as Kano in Nigeria, Surabaya or Medan in Indonesia, and Guadalajara in Mexico, into metropolitan cities without stemming the flow to the capital.

Some researchers argue that reversing this trend may depend on the attention given to women. Jodi Jacobson maintains that "high total fertility and population growth rates persist in the majority of relatively urbanized developing countries where the economic and social status of women remains low."¹⁷ Jacobson found that those countries, mostly in east Asia, which "invested heavily to achieve universal primary and secondary education, open opportunities for women in the labour force, and make available family planning services," now have below replacement level fertility and a relatively low incidence of poverty.

Women in developing countries usually provide the family's basic needs. Ensuring their access to economic resources and social services would yield much higher benefits for the security of even low-income households than investing in men's productivity. Rural or urban development strategies that ignore or reinforce gender bias in the socio-economic system are thus likely to perpetuate poverty and rapid population growth.

United Nations projections show that fertility rates in many cities will continue at a relatively high level. Providing the necessary services in rural areas, such as education, health care and family planning, would help lower fertility and reduce the pressure to migrate in the first place; and in the second place would help to make urban problems more tractable.

Migration as a Global Issue

In most discussions of the question, urbanization and international migration are treated as two different phenomena; but there are important links between them.

Migration is a barometer of changing social, economic and political circumstances, at the national and international levels. In both cases, migration is a sign of wide disparities in economic and social conditions between origin and destination. Internal and international movement are both eased by better and cheaper transport and communications. Both feature networks

and support systems established by early migrants, which reduce costs and risks and encourage later arrivals. Another common feature is unpredictable and volatile movement as the result of specific short-term or long-term crises. Most of these crises produce in the first place local rather

Migration Pressures Grow

On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the average woman has five children; in industrial Europe, she has between one and two. This high fertility rate, coupled with the young age structure of the population, is leading to a massive increase in the Mediterranean region's labour force. Industrial Europe's labour force increased by 6 million during 1960-70; it will grow by only 1.7 million in the 1990s. By contrast, the southern and eastern Mediterranean regular labour force, which increased by 7.4 million during 1960-70, will grow by 22.4 million in the 1990s. This imbalance—far more pronounced than the gap between the industrial and developing countries in general—will certainly add to migratory pressures.¹⁸

than international movements, though migrants may cross borders in search of security.

Continuing rapid population growth in many parts of the developing world; high levels of natural increase in cities as well as continuing rural-urban migration; the addition of unprecedented numbers of young people, many with some education, to the urban labour force; continuous contact with the values and lifestyles of more affluent countries, coupled with a general rise in expectations, indicate the likelihood of more rather than less international migration in the future.

No Room to Move?

Migration has always been a feature of development: but today's migrants are pushing into territory already occupied by others. Recipient areas and countries are already under stress. More people are on the move, but options for successful migration are fewer than ever before. The next chapter explores the international dimensions of an issue that could become the human crisis of our age.


3. International Migration: Numbers and Trends

The impact of international migration is far greater than the figures suggest. Firstly, official statistics substantially underestimate actual numbers; irregular migration, for example, is rising rapidly. Secondly, migrants are often in the peak years of fertility; they "introduce an element which sharply breaks the usual development pattern of a population."¹ Added to the natural increase of established foreign or foreign-born populations, these new inflows mean that, "immigration is playing an increasing role in total

population growth in many OECD countries."² Thirdly, migration from a given area tends to follow established paths and networks, so that migrant settlements are concentrated in a few places within a country. This adds to their visibility, and increases the perception of cultural differences. "Issues of ethnic relations, social integration and distributive justice have proved difficult for states to deal with under such circumstances."³ In 1982, a United Nations report on international migration noted that "while western Europe's foreign workers have now become entrenched as a structural element of labour markets in most of the receiving countries, their economic integration has not been paralleled by their social integration in the host societies."⁴ More than ten years later, the statement remains valid.



The Contribution of Natural Increase and Net Migration to the Total Population Increase in Selected OECD Countries Between 1 January 1980 and 1 January 1991¹



1. The population increase between 1980 and 1990 is calculated as a percentage of the population at the beginning of the period.

2. Between 1 January 1980 and 1 January 1989.

Source: OECD (1991) *Labour Force Statistics, 1980-1991*

Europe

Some 15 million people entered western Europe as migrants between 1980 and 1992⁵. Many western European countries must now be recognized as what Demetrios Papadimitriou has termed "immigration countries of great significance."⁶

"Foreign residents" in European Community countries totalled 13 million persons, or 4 per cent of the population, in 1990. This excludes large numbers of the "foreign-born" who had become naturalized. Of the 13 million, 8 million come from outside the EC. Of these, 50 per cent originate in north Africa, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Migrants from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are increasing as a proportion of overall international migrants.⁷

In former west Germany, by 1990, the foreign resident population had risen from 4.5 million in 1980 to 5.2 million, or 8.4 per cent of the total population. The largest numbers of foreign residents from non-EC countries in 1990 were Turks (1.7 million), Yugoslavs (652,000) and Poles (241,000).⁸

In the case of France, foreign residents made up 6.4 per cent of 1990 population, with Algerians (620,000) and Moroccans (585,000) following Portuguese (646,000) in size of representation. In addition to foreign residents, there are more than 1 million migrants who have acquired citizenship, as well as some half-million French citizens from overseas departments and territories in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.⁹

For the United Kingdom, foreign citizens totalled 1.9 million or 3.3 per cent of the total population in 1990. In addition, the "ethnic minority population"—most of whom come originally from the Caribbean and south Asia—make up 4.7 per cent of the population. The overall population of immigrant origins is thus estimated at 4.5 million or 8 per cent of the total population.¹⁰

In Sweden, Iranians and Lebanese are the largest groups of current migrants. In neighbouring Norway, it is Pakistanis, while Spain and Italy are receiving increasing numbers of Filipinos.¹¹

Eastern and central Europe—Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland—have become receiving countries, with migrants and asylum-seekers originating elsewhere in the region, but also in the developing world, crossing newly open borders. These countries, like eastern Germany (the former German Democratic Republic) are now host to hundreds of thousands of new migrants, with little experience to help them cope with the influx.

Southern Europe has also been an increasingly popular destination, particularly for migrants from north Africa and west Africa, and for those with "patrial" and linguistic links. This latter group includes Argentinians of Italian origin, Latin Americans of Spanish and Portuguese descent, and those from the former Portuguese colonies in Africa.¹²

After 50 years of rather low immigration to the United States, levels began to rise substantially in the 1960s.¹³ The number of developing country migrants grew dramatically between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, reaching some 90 per cent of total admissions in 1985-1989. During the 1980s, 7,338,000 immigrants entered the United States legally, and an unknown number illegally. The total may be as high as 10 million.

For Australia and Canada, the rates of increase during this period were even higher, but starting at much lower levels. By 1985-87, 70 per cent of immigrant admissions to Canada were from the developing countries, and for Australia the level was slightly in excess of 50 per cent.¹⁴

The Oil-Producing Countries

Among Arab oil-producers, preference was initially given to Arab migrants, many of whom sought permanent settlement. However, by 1980, Indians and Pakistanis accounted for 23 per cent of the immigrant workforce, and south-east Asia another 6 per cent.¹⁵ By the time of the Gulf crisis in 1990, Asians may have been the majority.¹⁶

From 1975 to 1980, total numbers employed increased from 1.8 to 2.8 million, with 36 per cent of the total employed in Saudi Arabia. In 1975, expatriates constituted 33 per cent of Libya's workforce (260,000); in 1983, numbers had reached 569,000, representing between 55 and 60 per cent of the workforce, the majority Egyptians and Asians. By 1985, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states together hosted some 7.2 million foreigners, of whom 5.1 million were migrant workers, making up 70 per cent, on average, of the workforce. Of these, 63 per cent were Asians, 87 per cent of these drawn from four countries: India, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. However, numbers from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand had increased substantially in the preceding years.¹⁷ For Pakistan, labour migration, overwhelmingly to the Gulf, provided work to numbers equivalent to one third of new entrants to the labour force during the period of the Fifth National Plan (1978-83).¹⁸ In addition, Iraq's labour force included between one and three million expatriate workers, predominately Egyptians.¹⁹ The Gulf War uprooted an estimated two million workers from Iraq and the Gulf States, the great majority from other parts of the Arab world and Asia.²⁰

Asia

Japan, as the only large advanced industrial economy in the region, has found itself the principal focus for international migration since the mid 1980s, particularly since



International Migration: Numbers and Trends

demand for foreign labour dropped off in the oil-producing countries of the Gulf.²¹

Post-war Japan had few visa restrictions for visitors from elsewhere in the region. Considerable numbers of visitors from such countries as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran during the 1980s took illegal employment in construction and services.²² The government reinstated visa requirements for nationals of many Asian countries in the late 1980s. The number of foreigners overstay-


ing their visas increased from 20,500 in 1989 to 280,000 in 1992.²³

Major changes in migration patterns involving the south-east Asian "newly industrializing economies" have taken place as continuing high rates of economic growth have been paralleled by a rather rapid demographic transition. The combination of dynamic economies and slow growth in the labour force has resulted in rising wages and labour shortages in many sectors.²⁴




Gross Flows of Immigrants and Asylum Seekers or Refugees in Selected OECD Countries, 1980-1990 (thousands)

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES



— Entries of foreigners (excluding asylum seekers, seasonal and frontier workers)
 - - - Entries of asylum seekers

NON EUROPEAN COUNTRIES



— Entries of permanent settlers (excluding refugees)
 - - - Registered refugees

Source: OECD, SOPEMI, 1992, pp. 21-22.

In the Republic of Korea, wages increased by 50 per cent between 1987 and 1992. The export of labour, primarily to the Arab oil-producing countries, which peaked in 1982 at 150,000, had fallen to 21,000 in 1988.²⁵ Secondary school leavers are in short supply as an increasing proportion of young people are entering post-secondary education. As a result, there is a considerable shortage of workers in manufacturing and mining.²⁶ A major debate is now taking place on the development of a policy on the admission of foreign workers.

Singapore has a history of depending on foreign labour as a means of alleviating labour shortages.²⁷ As in Korea, slow growth in the labour force has resulted in labour shortage in many sectors. At present, there are an estimated 175,000 foreign workers, amounting to some 15 per cent of the workforce.

South Asian countries have become an important source of migrants of all kinds to all regions of the world. Their role in labour migration to the oil-exporting countries has been noted above. In the past two years, rather large numbers of migrants from the Indian sub-continent have been making their way to Japan, finding work in manufacturing and construction. Smaller numbers have also been brought in on labour contracts to the Republic of Korea.²⁸

The Philippines is the major supplier of contract labour overseas from the region, with 650,000 exit permits issued in 1991. Viet Nam was a major supplier of contract labour to the former Soviet bloc, with some 60,000 in the former GDR in 1989 and 34,000 in the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in 1990.²⁹

Malaysia, while providing skilled migrants to Japan, is host to perhaps a million illegal migrants from Indonesia, as well as others from Thailand.³⁰

The Philippines, Republic of Korea and Viet Nam are also major sources of migrants for permanent settlement in North America. By the late 1980s, Asian immigrants constituted at least 40 per cent of immigrant flows to Canada, the US and Australia.³¹ Pakistan, Iran and Sri Lanka contribute 35 per cent of illegal migrants to Australia.³²

Latin America

The major source of migrants in Latin America, by far, is Mexico. Estimates based

on the 1980 census suggest that of 2.2 million Mexicans enumerated abroad, 99 per cent were in the United States. World Bank labour-force estimates suggest that this amounted to 10 per cent of Mexico's domestic labour force.³³ During the 1980s, three million Mexicans entered the United States, one third of all immigration for the decade.³⁴ The second major sending country is Colombia, with between 700,000 and 1 million outside its borders—between 9 and 12.5 per cent of the country's workforce.

In the Southern Cone, Argentina, with nearly 7 per cent of its population foreign-born, according to the 1980 census, has been the principal destination for migrants from the neighbouring countries of Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. However, in more recent years, with economic recession affecting the country, immigration has diminished, and out-migration has increased.

Further north, Brazil has received significant numbers of migrants from neighbouring countries in recent years, though substantial numbers of Brazilian rural migrants have also moved to Paraguay in the same period. Venezuela, with some 7.2 per cent foreign-born in the 1981 census is the major destination for Colombians, and has also attracted large numbers from Chile, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Ecuador, Peru and Costa Rica.³⁵

In the Caribbean, the major outflow is to the United States, but there are also well-established movements of significant volume from the Dominican Republic to Venezuela and Puerto Rico, where the majority involved are women. There has also been a well-established migration connection from Haiti to the Dominican Republic.³⁶

Africa

In west Africa, as Stanton Russell and Teitelbaum put it, "historically, the movement of people flowed as freely as trade in goods and services." Migration routes were established in many cases long before national boundaries were fixed.³⁷ In the 1960s, Ghana was the largest magnet for cross-border migrants. Today, Côte d'Ivoire, with an estimated 30 per cent of its people made up of foreign residents, has taken over that position.³⁸ Nigeria, like Ghana, a

net exporter of professional and skilled labour, is also the focus of rather substantial movements of international migration, but many of those involved are undocumented, and census data is not available.

Migration within the sub-region is often cyclical, responding to different periods of labour demand. It is usually informal, and highly responsive to changing economic conditions between countries. In west Africa, more than anywhere else in the world, most international migration is essentially an extension of internal migration. Borders are artificial, and centres of economic activity are often cut off from their hinterlands.³⁹

In southern Africa, the predominant flow in recent decades has been from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to the Republic of South Africa. Labour flows to South Africa have also included smaller numbers from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. By 1985, while the population of foreign workers employed in South African mines fell off from 78 per cent of employees in 1974 to some 40 per cent in 1985-86, the size of the country's foreign-born population increased to 1.86 million from 586,000 in 1960. While, for political and other reasons, numbers of migrants from other surrounding countries have fallen off, those from Lesotho have increased substantially through the 1980s. In 1985, in excess of 50 per cent of Lesotho's labour-force was employed outside the country.⁴⁰

The most important movement out of the continent has been from north Africa to western Europe. In 1970, there were some 1.2 million migrants from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia resident in six OECD countries. By 1989-90, there were nearly 2.1 million in eight European countries. These figures exclude illegal migrants. One of the results of the amnesty campaigns of 1986 and 1990 in Italy, is that the country has discovered that it is also host to large numbers of Maghrebis.⁴¹

Refugees and Asylum-seekers

In the 1980s and 1990s, refugees came to dominate international migratory movements, particularly in Africa, south Asia and Indochina, as well as central America. The Gulf war and the breakup of Yugoslavia produced large numbers of additional asylum-seekers. During 1991 a total of 660,000 asylum-seekers sought admission

to western Europe and north America. Numbers increased considerably in 1992, when Germany alone recorded over 500,000 applications.⁴² The second largest destination of asylum-seekers for 1991, the United States, received only 70,000 people.

The Changing Migrant Profile

The elimination of discrimination in the immigration policies of the United States, Canada and Australia, and the recruitment of labour to support expansion of manufacturing and services in northern Europe, drew the best-qualified immigrants from developing countries. The initial outflow of professionals, students (who often stayed on after their studies) and skilled workers, was followed in later years by the movement of family members under reunification arrangements.

Family reunification has been described by one European social scientist as "the persistent fallout from the male-only labour migration from the 1960s and 1970s."⁴³ The relative decrease of heads of families and increase in family members in the migrant flow has transformed the "immigrant profile" in western Europe, north America and Australia/New Zealand. This is true even in countries which do not encourage permanent settlement, as long-term labour migrants have been joined by their families.

The right to family reunification is a common feature of immigration law. Thus, "the potential for future immigration depends primarily on the magnitude of previous immigration and the size and geographic distribution of family networks of previous immigrants."⁴⁴ Its economic impact has been less than many critics, particularly in the United States, had predicted.⁴⁵ In western Europe, the proportion of migrants in the "economically active" category dropped from around 80 per cent in the early 1960s to below 50 per cent in the mid-1980s,⁴⁶ and below that subsequently. However, these figures were based on the mistaken assumption that few women migrants would join the labour force (see Chapter 5). Lobbies for particular industries and occupations, which appear to be highly dependent on migrant workers, continue to exert pressure to maintain openings for the entry of unskilled workers.⁴⁷

4. Senders and Receivers: Costs and Benefits

There is always “pull” as well as “push” as migrants move in search of a better life. For each migrant the balance between them changes with time, space and circumstances. At one end of the spectrum are students and professionals looking for better education or career opportunities. Somewhere in the middle are migrant workers, who would often prefer to stay at home, but move in search of a livelihood. Those whose situation is desperate are often called “economic” or “environmental” “refugees”. At the far end of the spectrum are refugees and asylum-seekers in the conventional sense, forced to move by immediate threats to life itself.

Pressures to migrate are increasing: the growth of a global economy has emphasized rather than reduced inequality between nations. Images and information through the global communications media and social networks strengthen the “pull” of the richer countries.

Migration is a response to a stimulus—but it is also a decision, part of an individual, family or group strategy for survival or a means to a better life. Migratory movement may well continue even after economic circumstances in the sending area improve. People are likely to be attracted to places where members of their own family and people from their own locality and culture have established themselves.¹ Because of these connections, apparently similar communities in sending countries may exhibit radically different patterns of involvement in international migration.

People will take extraordinary risks to improve their circumstances, whether it means defying orders to move or crossing forbidden borders. On the whole, it appears that people “treasure possibilities for mobility, but at the same time see any attempt to force mobility upon them as an infringement upon their personal space and upon their sense of integrity”.²

However, migration is a social process, not simply an aggregate of millions of individual actions. In coming to terms with its complexities it is necessary to move from a consideration of individual cases and local circumstances to an examination of broader trends and global conditions, and back again.

The movement of people involves not only markets and governments but the decisions of millions of families and individuals. In this respect, international migration trends are rather like aggregate fertility rates, which while heavily influenced by societal and governmental forces, ultimately are determined by the rather intimate decisions of individuals.

Source: Sharon Stanton Russell and Michael Teitelbaum, *International Migration and International Trade*, World Bank, 1992, p. 1.

Human Capital: Migration for Employment

Migration is also an economic process. Labour migration is as much a global phenomenon as trade in commodities or manufactured goods. It is part of a broader pattern, and evidence of changing economic, social and cultural relationships across the globe. Like trade, it involves not only national and international markets, but also governments and the political process.³

Labour migration has a major impact on the economies and societies of “receiving” countries and communities. Through remittances home it also makes a major contribution to international financial flows and to the budgets of certain sending countries. To some extent, the remittances of urban migrants relieve rural poverty. But remittances do little to redress the balance of resources between countries; nor do they diminish the concentration of power and wealth in the cities. To the extent that migrant labour is of value to the receiving economy, it may in fact reinforce the existing imbalances. Migrants are often the young, the educated,



Senders and Receivers: Costs and Benefits

the able—the very people of most value to societies in transition.

As a *Worldwatch* report, published nearly 15 years ago, put it, “immigration has increased the human capital of the receiving countries, boosted or sustained their growth rates, given their native populations a cushion against hardship in times of economic difficulty, protected their competitive position in world trade and dampened inflationary pressures.”⁴ The role of immigration in fuelling the economic boom of western Europe in the 1960s, and in the Gulf States during the 1970s and 80s are the most obvious cases of the impact of labour migration on economic growth. However when economies go into recession past (or even present) economic benefits are not foremost in the public mind when they consider the impact of immigration.

Migrants are among the most enterprising people in their communities. The money they send home may fuel development, but they represent human capital their countries can ill afford to lose.



Liaison/R. Nickelberg

Nation-states and migrant workers

Nation-states define the political community to be served in terms of their geographical boundaries. Boundaries determine membership, and substantial immigration raises serious questions about the extension of membership to newcomers, as well as the pressures of additional numbers of members on limited resources.⁵ Put another way, “Unregulated and emergency migrations bespeak a loss of control. They challenge the capacity of governments to uphold basic sovereignty, in this case the choice of who resides in one’s own country.”⁶

Where legal channels are closed, migrants will enter by whatever means are available to them. As Ronald Skeldon has concluded, “given the economic and demographic developments in the [Asia/Pacific] region which have seen the emergence of labour-surplus and labour-deficit areas, and richer and poorer areas, international flows are inevitable. Rather than attempting to prevent the flows, policy-makers should be prepared to plan for them.”⁷

It may be salutary to consider some reflections on the topic of international migration and the world economy following the 1973 energy crisis, when the receiving countries had all moved to impose strict immigration controls:

Restrictions on migratory flows have the effect of distorting both the optimal economic allocation of labour and the international distribution of income. Quite apart from considerations of efficiency, basic standards of international equity give rise to concern about a unilateral decision, the costs of which are borne not by the decision-maker but by someone else. It is precisely this kind of situation which international cooperation is designed to prevent, and the unilateral imposition of restrictions represents a breakdown in this cooperation.⁸

Migration has an impact on the sending as well as the receiving community. Remittances sent by migrants affect local and national economies; their absence constrains social change among the families and communities left behind.

Excepting catastrophic outflows, migration is very much a part of the development process. Eventually, as a country establishes the economic, social, political and environmental conditions for

sustained and balanced economic growth, then it also establishes a balance among the forces driving migration. Migration does not cease, but it becomes one option among many.⁹ In other words, development—nationally, or within a country, or on a broader international basis—removes out-migration as a problem.

Developing countries have found development progressively more difficult. The world economy expands more slowly than it did thirty years ago. Markets for their manufactured goods are harder to find, and terms of trade have moved steadily against their primary products. Continuing high population growth has increased the workforce but has done nothing to create jobs. In the 1960s the ratio of annual labour-force growth in the developing countries compared with the industrialized countries was 4:1, in the 1990s, the ratio had increased to 12:1.¹⁰ In these circumstances, nations and individuals alike have found migration an attractive option.

Apart from earning foreign exchange, the principal economic benefits to sending countries are better opportunities for job-seekers remaining at home. There may also be benefits from investments and technology transfers by returning migrants. Sending countries risk their investment in the upbringing and education of the migrant workforce, and the "opportunity cost" of their notional contribution to the home country.

The loss of skilled professional, technical and business migrants creates skill shortages in key areas, higher costs and development bottlenecks.¹¹ Africa, in particular, has lost an estimated one third of its highly-educated manpower in recent decades.¹²

The loss of high-level personnel is not entirely the result of the "pull" of job prospects overseas. For many graduates, migration is the only way to find a job related to their skills. The alternative, public sector employment—often the only option in fields such as medicine—does not reward professionals on anything like the scale available overseas.

Meanwhile, the receiving country obtains ready-made workers without any investment. Migration attracts the younger and better-educated; those who already have work, albeit at low wages and with

little prospect of improvement; and those who have the highest energy and aspirations.¹³

Remittances and Development

Globally, annual remittances may reach \$70 billion—second only to oil in value among international flows. Hard currency remittances are critical to a number of countries' participation in world trade.¹⁴ Migrant workers' vulnerability to expulsion emphasizes the risk to developing countries of relying too heavily on labour migration as a source of foreign earnings. The sudden repatriation of some two million migrant workers from the Gulf States and Iraq in 1990 had a dramatic effect on the economies of sending countries, notably Jordan and Yemen, as well as some labour-exporting countries in south and south-east Asia. Combined remittances had averaged several billion dollars per year.¹⁵

Despite their volume, evidence on the economic contribution of remittances to national development is inconclusive, and some observers question whether remittances find their way into productive investment.¹⁶

However, remittances may be used to pay for school fees, improve educational facilities or invest in new technology. Sahelian workers in France jointly finance social initiatives, including the construction of health facilities and schools.¹⁷ Individual remittances are used primarily for family necessities. Similar results are reported for Lesotho. In a study of two provinces in Kenya, approximately half of remittance income is put aside to pay school fees. Other studies for the same country indicate the importance of remittance funds in financing improvement in school facilities in rural areas.¹⁸

On the whole, studies demonstrate that remittances are used for current consumption, health and education and that they contribute to higher living standards for "remittance" households. A minority of the population may benefit, but this private advantage can be turned to a broader public purpose. In any case, to have allowed even a minority to move out of poverty and economic uncertainty may be a contribution to self-reliance.¹⁹

Reinforcing or establishing local social norms regarding the best utilization of

remittances helps optimize the impact of migrant earnings on the home community. Effective use of remittances may reduce pressure to migrate if they are combined with other forms of investment, social programmes and long-term population stabilization efforts.²⁰

Social Impact

In the cities of south Asia, the Middle East and north Africa, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, male migrants are in a considerable majority. This reflects the tendency to leave wives and children at home in the village.²¹ Some 40 per cent of rural households in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are headed by women, largely as a result of male labour migration. Similarly, some 30 per cent of households in a number of Caribbean countries are headed by women partly as a result of male out-migration.²²

Studies of male migration to South Africa from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland found that the long absences (an average of 15 years spent away) resulted in a transformation of social patterns and sex-based economic and social roles in the home community.²³ In some cases, such situations can offer new opportunities for women. In others, women's autonomy is curtailed, both by social expectations and by an increased work burden.

Importing Technology

As early as 1976, the ILO's World Employment Conference emphasized the importance of "a new international division of labour" to avoid the need to migrate for employment. This approach assumed a more liberal world trading regime so that developing countries could take advantage of their low labour costs, and that industrial countries would not protect domestic industries against competition. In the 1990s, while developing countries have gone a long way to opening their economies, there has been no matching response from the industrial countries.²⁴

As an alternative to exporting "human capital" in the form of migrant labour, some countries have imported technology and investment in order to make use of low-cost local labour.²⁵ Typical arrangements are tax-free export processing zones

(EPZs) and border industries, which investors have used for labour-intensive assembly operations, placing the host country in the role of sub-contractor.

EPZs have considerable value in absorbing labour. Successful operations may contribute to keeping jobs at home, rather than exporting people. The disadvantage of EPZs and similar arrangements, from the host country's point of view, is that the host controls little of the operation and value added.²⁶

Development and Migration

Evidence from western Europe and north America suggests that the availability of jobs is far more important than higher wages as such in stimulating migration.²⁷ So it might be thought that the correct international development strategy would be to invest in creating jobs in the domestic economy so as to avoid the need for migration. As Jan Pronk, the Netherlands Minister for Development Co-operation put it: "the process...calls for innovative policies and for development activities targeted to create a resourceful environment that is congenial also to the better educated and skilled."²⁸

Yet development has been associated with mass movements of population throughout modern history. In the short run, then, development increases rather than reduces the impetus for migration, even though fertility may be falling, as in the Republic of Korea in the 1970s. However, with the completion of economic modernization and with lower fertility, the pool of potential migrants will gradually diminish. This has been the case in the Republic of Korea and may be expected to happen in Mexico, where fertility has been falling for nearly a generation.

The means to reduce migration pressures over the long term are to stimulate economic growth and job creation at home, and thus promote sustainable national development. Successful development invests in enhancing the human capabilities of the population, but also builds opportunities for them and reduces uncertainty and insecurity.

5. The Gender Dimension

It is often assumed that most migrants are men. In reality, women make up nearly half of the international migrant population.¹ In the European OECD countries, "projections suggest that women will constitute the largest part of the foreign-born population in the medium and long run".² In sub-Saharan Africa, analysis of 1970 and 1980 census data indicate that in one third of countries, including Burkina Faso, Swaziland and Togo, female foreign-born populations were as large as the male.³ And women have been the majority of rural-urban migrants in Latin America since the 1960s. In countries such as Chile, women move in large numbers to do seasonal work in export industries.⁴

The effect of gender differences is equally underestimated. "Gender differences in social and economic roles influence migration decision-making processes, modify the conceptualization of household strategy, influence the sex composition of labour migration, are often incorporated into immigration policies and are embedded in the organization of ethnic enclaves."⁵

Patterns of Female Migration

Although women are often thought of as "passive movers", migrating only to join or follow family members, research has found that economic rather than personal or social considerations predominate. Surveys of female migrants in southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean indicate that 50-70 per cent moved in search of employment. Even in south Asia and Africa, with the highest proportion of women who reported moving primarily for family reasons, the percentage of those with economic motivations often exceeded 50 per cent.⁶

Female migrants commonly make their first move while still in their teens, accounting for 25-45 per cent of migrant

women. The percentage of young, single women seems particularly high in rural-urban migration streams. This is partly a reflection of general population trends. Where high fertility rates have increased the proportion of young people, saturation of the labour market compels them to move in search of job opportunities.

Female migrants are concentrated particularly in the 16-24 years age group, before first marriage, but migration peaks again among women in their late fifties and sixties, primarily separated, divorced or widowed women. Female divorcees are disproportionately represented in migrant groups. Across all regions, migration of elderly women is far more common than in men of a similar age. At whatever age, most women who migrate on their own are not married. Regional exceptions to this pattern are found mainly in Africa.⁷

Status and Migration

The prevalence of single women among female migrants reflects their limited opportunities in rural areas. Lower education levels and fewer rights in general restrict women's economic and social autonomy. In patrilineal societies women's access to the land and means of production traditionally depends on their marital status. In sub-Saharan Africa, where women produce up to 80 per cent of food grown for local consumption, only 8 per cent hold title to the land they work.⁸ This becomes critical when traditional support structures erode or falter, for example when men migrate.

The United Nations found that "the living conditions of women left behind often oblige them to migrate in search of employment. Indeed, a direct link exists in developing countries between internal and international migration and the increase in

female-headed households.⁹ The economic benefits of male migration do not necessarily translate into adequate support for families at home. According to Findley and Williams, a "surprising number of studies have documented that fewer than one in five wives has received any remittances. When remittances have been received, they have seldom accounted for as much as half of the family income."¹⁰ Without legal claim to economic resources, and no extended family to fall back on, these women have no choice but to seek wage labour in commercial or industrial centres.

Since the rural economy offers young women few employment opportunities, families will often encourage their migration. In Latin America, in the Philippines and in the South Pacific the emigration of young girls can be part of a household's strategy to survive. High fertility combined with poverty seem to be determinants of such strategies. In Asia as well as Latin America, evidence suggests that "female migrants tend to come from larger than average families." A survey of rural households in central Mexico, for example, found that 37 per cent of the daughters in families with more than seven siblings had migrated, compared to only 20 per cent of the sons. When economic standing is accounted for, the survey shows that "among large families with no rights to land, 52 per cent of the daughters had migrated, compared with only 30 per cent of the daughters from large families with land rights."¹¹

Remittances from migrating daughters show that female migration is at least as important as male migration in helping rural households adjust to the impact of large family size on per capita income. In fact, female migrants seem to remit more regularly than their male counterparts despite lower incomes. Studies from Asia also suggest that women remit a larger share of their income than men. Surveys in the West Indies even found that "the immigration of women to the United States is preferred to that of men because the women were considered more likely to send back the money they earned."¹²

Single mothers are most strongly affected by rural poverty, and they constitute a large part of the migrant population in Latin America and Africa. However, the likelihood of female migration seems

correlated to the number of children. Surveys in different settings found that "migrant women [tend] to have an average of 1.6 children compared to 4.6 children among non-migrant women in rural areas."¹³ The ability to leave children in the care of an extended family, which might be easier with only one or two children, may be the main consideration influencing a mother's mobility.

Low status limits women's choices at home and may increase pressure to migrate. It also affects their opportunities at the point of destination. Migrant women from developing countries tend to have had little schooling at the time of their moves. While their level of educational attainment is higher than for rural non-migrants, they are less educated not just relative to male migrants but also compared with native women in the receiving community. This holds true for rural-urban as well as international female migrants, even though the latter show the highest educational attainment of any migrant group.

In addition, women's family roles and the "social forces defining the sexual division of labour" affect the mobility of women and their adaptation to the host society, especially their participation in the labour force. Research on the employment of migrant women has emphasized their marginalization through split labour markets. This process results in "double, triple or four-fold discrimination of female migrants by their sex, birthplace, class and acceptance of their subordination as natural or inevitable."¹⁴

Women and Work

Across most settings, paid employment for migrant women is characterized by "the lowest wage, least secure, and lowest status jobs," mostly in housework, child care and trade. The proportion of female migrants in domestic or personal services has been estimated between one-third and one-half, with fewer than a quarter finding jobs in the blue and white collar professions.¹⁵

These employment patterns apply to internal and international migrants alike. In the Netherlands, migrant women's low education levels limit their options in the labour force. Hence they may find themselves restricted to jobs in a segmented market set aside for migrant

women.¹⁶ Among women who had worked prior to departure overseas, in the two years following emigration only a few were able to enter their former occupations, and a majority ended up in the same low-status, low-wage production and service jobs as unskilled female migrants. Men too experienced downward mobility, but the relative decline in women's employment status was found to be far greater.

In fact, economic structures can play into the subordinate status of women. For example, Thai patterns of development, it has been argued, have emphasized the kind of labour often associated with the employment of young women: low cost, an absence of labour assertiveness against management, and expendability. High labour turnover prevents women from establishing themselves or from obtaining long-term benefits from employment. Yet, economic necessity continues to increase the flow of female migrants to industrial centres in Thailand. Between 1975 and 1985, the proportion of women migrating to Bangkok rose from 53 to 63 per cent. Among teenage migrants to the capital between 1974 and 1987 the proportion of females rose from 16 to 43 per cent, and unemployment levels were particularly low within this group.¹⁷

Lower education levels also limit women's possibility for interaction with the host community, especially for international migrants who have to cope with language barriers. As a result, for the majority of female migrants, daily life is lived predominantly within the migrant community. Women's social ties and networks tend to be restricted to their own ethnic group, which also impedes upward mobility. Undoubtedly, literacy and education programmes for women in both rural and urban areas are crucial for improving women's economic opportunities. Such programmes would not only increase the competitiveness of female migrants, but would also benefit the economic standing of women in the sending community. Only through better education can women develop the skills to take charge of their economic affairs on an equal footing with men. Changes in agricultural production and commercial activity require the kind of flexibility that results from better education.

Vulnerability of Migrant Women

Two human rights concerns of vital importance to female migrants are related to women's overall low status. One is protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. Migrant women, especially refugees, are vulnerable to rape, abduction, sexual harassment and physical violence, and demands for sexual favours in return for documentation or obtaining goods. Such experiences are common among labour migrants in domestic employment. Reports of maltreatment of women employed as maids overseas in the late 1980s led sending countries to impose temporary restrictions on the issuing of overseas work permits to women.¹⁸ Yet little has been done to increase intervention through national laws and to enhance the role of embassies as the major official channel for the protection of international female migrants. Although illegal trafficking of women and coerced prostitution are by nature difficult to document, their prevalence is common knowledge and calls for concerted legal intervention at the national and international level.

Equally important is the absence of reproductive health services. For female migrants or refugees, unwanted pregnancies create even more problems than for women who are still in traditional support networks. An unwanted pregnancy disrupts employment, which is critical for single women, especially single mothers. In addition, the precarious living and health conditions of people on the move can easily push the strain of pregnancy and childbirth to crisis point. The provision of reproductive health services for female refugees and migrants, particularly in marginal urban areas, is therefore urgently needed.

Effects of Female Migration

The effects of female migration have to be considered in the context of economic development as well as social change.

Despite their disadvantaged position, migrant women have become significant economic actors at the national and international level. In Indonesia, by 1988 women accounted for 78 per cent of registered labour migrants. In Sri Lanka, by the mid-1980s, women represented some 60-70

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per cent of all Sri Lankan labour migrants. During that time, foreign remittances, largely from women in the Gulf States, were second only to tea as a source of foreign exchange for Sri Lanka.¹⁹ Even among married or dependent female migrants, a higher proportion is usually part of the labour force compared with native women. A continuing longitudinal study of Filipino and Korean immigrants to the United States has shown that migrant women have higher levels of labour-force participation (68 per cent for Filipinas and 55 per cent for Koreans) than native-born white women (49 per cent).²⁰ These findings are confirmed by studies of migrant communities in western Europe.

This is partly a result of the particular age composition of female migrants, as discussed above. A study of Turkish women living in Germany showed that 56 per cent

were between 20 to 30 years of age, and 76 per cent were younger than 35 years. In west Africa, an increasing number of autonomous female migrants were found to be in the 15-34 years age group.²¹ The concentration in lower age categories might explain the high participation of migrant women in economic life, compared with indigenous women. Younger women may be more likely to accommodate themselves to a segmented market and to accept poor working conditions and levels of income.²²

Certain investment patterns also contribute to the integration of migrant women into the paid labour force. The export processing zones (EPZs) in parts of east and southeast Asia, the Americas and Africa attract many unskilled female workers in industries such as electronics, garments, textiles, toys and footwear. In South Korea, 75 per cent of workers employed in clothing and electronics are women.²³ Similarly, on Batam Island in Indonesia, a modern factory-city has been established within the new "growth triangle", based on Singapore, and including Johore Province of Malaysia. The majority of workers are young, unmarried women; labour-force plans project employment opportunities for 50,000 women.²⁴

EPZ regulations commonly suspend labour laws protecting workers, and especially women, from long hours, poor working and living conditions, and other forms of cost-cutting. Regulations on Batam Island, for example, allow employers to dismiss any woman who becomes pregnant. Such conditions, along with low wages and an absence of security or prospects for the future, encourage workers to think about further migration. Many of the women in Mexico's *maquiladora* border industries are the primary bread-winners because of high male unemployment. However, the low wages barely improve their situation and there is a high probability of a further move.²⁵ International migration becomes an option for at least a minority of the work-force, already uprooted from family and community.

Invisible Women

Despite strong evidence of labour force participation, immigration policies still tend to assume that "migrants" are men

Migrant women are assumed to be dependants — but most can and do work, though they may be over-qualified for the work they find.



UNEPA/Lily Salensen

and that women are "dependents". Women's right to work may be severely restricted; access to support systems and social services may be limited; rights to naturalization may be indirect and dependent on the status of the spouse. Single women have great difficulty in securing legal admission as immigrants in the industrialized countries. The parallel finding that a large proportion of women among undocumented migrants are on their own economically is one result.²⁶

Researchers and policy-makers have only recently begun to address systematically the "invisibility" of migrant women. A necessary first step should be the improvement of gender-specific data collection in order to document the demographic profiles and economic contributions of female migrants. This would encourage appropriate economic policies in both sending and receiving areas.

Assessing the gender dimension of migration also requires a look at its impact on social change. Large-scale movements of people transform household structures, sex ratios and marriage patterns in both sending and receiving communities. Initial out-migration of young males changes established ways for couples to meet and marry. A United Nations study found a significant correlation between male migration and the marital status of young women in sending communities.²⁷ For example, in Malaysia and Thailand, the departure of young unmarried women from rural areas to work in EPZs is associated with the migration of young men overseas.

As a result, household structures are likely to change at either end of the migration journey, including the increase of female-headed households. Some women who stay behind change their living arrangements within their kin network, to gain access to economic resources.

The migrant family adapts to the needs and possibilities of settlement in the host country. Migrant families are often divided and recomposed according to the conditions of the labour market, salary and accommodation available abroad. Consequently, families are split and live separately, other relatives join the family, or the family might live in an isolated nuclear structure, as in industrial societies.

Impact on Fertility

Another area of demographic interest is the impact of migration on fertility rates. But even though the majority of female migrants are in the reproductive age group, an ILO review found that surprisingly few studies of migrant women examine their childbearing patterns before and after migration. The available information indicates that migrant women have fewer children at the time of migration and continue to have lower fertility compared with rural non-migrants. One study in Kenya found that rural migrants averaged 2.7 children ever born, compared with 5.8 for rural non-migrants of the same group.²⁸

However, there seems to be less of a correlation when comparing rural-urban migrants to urban-non-migrants, especially when age and education are taken into account. One study found that migrant women in Bangkok have an average of 3.7 children, compared to 4.2 among urban natives, but the differences diminished with longer residence. This suggests that fertility varies only temporarily and that migrant fertility ultimately catches up. This pattern was confirmed by case studies from other areas.²⁹

Evidence regarding the impact of migration on women's status within the family is inconclusive. It has been claimed that migration contributes to the emancipation of women, because they gain greater independence through wage earning which enhances their decision-making power within the family. Among couples from strongly patriarchal communities, the absence of in-laws can foster equality between spouses. This would seem most relevant in movements across borders: international migration journeys involve "a shift in socio-cultural systems" in parallel with "a change in gender stratification systems". Lim suggests that among demographic phenomena it has the most important implications for women's status.³⁰

However, international migration may not extend women's options as much as might be expected. Because of social networks, strong kin linkages, the extension of traditional social structures to new settings, their position in the ethnic enclave, and limited job opportunities, women's options may be only slightly more extensive

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than in the country of origin. In some cases they might actually diminish.

In war or civil crisis, women are usually left to secure the survival of the children and dependent elderly relatives. The global refugee population may be as much as 75 per cent female, and 60-80 per cent of refugee households are headed by women.³¹ So far, however, relief efforts have paid little attention to the specific needs of women, or to ensuring that women are involved in policy decisions on refugee assistance and the conduct of action programmes.

The dissolution of traditional social structures that accompanies migration has many implications for development programmes and migration-related policies. In particular, programmes for women

should take account of how mobility changes women's role in society, and what is needed to make the most of the possibilities of the change to improve women's status in both sending and receiving communities.

Policy should aim at broadening the options of women considering migration. Establishing reproductive health, family planning and counselling services is a necessary part of such interventions. Other interventions to raise women's social and economic status also contribute to their range of choice. Rural development schemes, in particular, should improve women's access to economic resources and increase their decision-making power in matters affecting agricultural production.

6. Refugees and Asylum-seekers — the Development Dimension

A distinction is often drawn between "political" refugees and "economic" migrants: but the distinction between economic and political causes of migration is not clear. "Under the actual conditions likely to produce mass outflows, economic disparities typically exist alongside political apprehension and civil violence."¹ Where demographic, economic and environmental pressures are reducing the margins for survival, political change and conflict may be the result. In such circumstances it is futile to assign one basic cause to migration, whether economic, political or environmental.

The size and scope of refugee movement have grown enormously in recent decades,

and many other conditions have changed, yet the instruments for responding to refugee movement and asylum claims are basically as they were in 1951. There is recognition that refugees have a right to seek asylum. At the same time, states reserve the sovereign right to grant or withhold it. The role of international co-operation is limited to mitigating particularly heavy burdens on countries of asylum.²

Despite growing numbers in north America and western Europe, and on the borders of the former Soviet bloc, refugees in the 1990s are overwhelmingly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Many of the countries with the largest refugee populations are among the world's poorest, and



UNHCR

In time of war or civil crisis, women bear the burden of keeping the family together. Up to 75 per cent of refugees are women or girls. This Ethiopian family is being bussed to safety in Kenya.

Refugees in Developing Countries

In the 1960s and 1970s, Indo-China produced an estimated 2 million refugees. Of these, more than 1 million were resettled in north America and Europe, 300,000 in China, and 450,000 remained in the region.³

In 1992, some 364,000 Cambodian refugees were receiving UN support outside the country.⁴ Thailand sheltered nearly 500,000 refugees from Indochina and Myanmar in December 1991.

In the world's largest refugee movement, 6 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran during the 1980s. Of these, approximately half are in Pakistan (3.1 million registered and 400,000 unregistered refugees). During 1992, large numbers of Afghan refugees began to return home.⁵ Iran has provided protection to 3.6 million persons, including 320,000 from Iraq. The west Bank and Gaza have a total population of 987,000 Palestinian refugees. Jordan holds 980,000 Palestinian refugees, Lebanon 313,000 and Syria 294,000.⁶

Political instability, the collapse of states and famine in the Horn of Africa produced complex flows of refugees, both within the region and in neighbouring countries, notably Kenya. By early 1989, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan were providing asylum to nearly 2 million refugees, principally from each others' countries.⁷ By 1992, with the worsening of the Somali situation, numbers of refugees and of the internally displaced in the region had increased further.

Of Africa's 5.2 million (December 1991) refugees, 982,000 — all from Mozambique — were in Malawi, and 729,000, principally from Ethiopia, in Sudan.⁸ By November 1992, an estimated 1.5 million Mozambican refugees were living in camps in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and other neighbouring countries. Although numbers are not known, perhaps 300,000 additional refugees may be in South Africa. The large flows out of the country were initially associated with the country's internal war; movement has increased further because of drought and other national disasters.⁹

Zaire has nearly 500,000 refugees from neighbouring states, particularly Angola. As recently as 1988, refugee totals for west Africa amounted to only 1 per cent of total numbers for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. By 1990, numbers had grown from 21,000 to 854,000, and to over 16 per cent of the total.¹⁰ In 1991 Guinea's population included nearly 550,000 refugees, including 405,000 from Liberia.¹¹

Millions have been displaced by conflict in Central America, but the vast majority remain within their own countries. UN estimates suggest that as many 1.2 million persons are in "refugee-like circumstances", and hence in need of assistance. The largest numbers in this category are in Mexico and Guatemala. Mexico protects some 50,000 central Americans recognized as refugees, and an unknown number of others.¹²

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created at the same time as the Refugee Convention was established, to provide "international protection" to refugees, and to find durable solutions to the situations in which they found themselves. These solutions included voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum, and resettlement in a third country.

The mandate of the UNHCR had initially been restricted to post-war Europe, but was widened in 1967. Since then UNHCR has undertaken activities on behalf of "a broader category of persons who do not necessarily meet the classical refugee definition."¹³

they have often exhibited the greatest generosity in their asylum policies.¹⁴

Refugee numbers are large and growing rapidly. The authoritative World Refugee Survey (1992) of the US Committee for Refugees calculated that as of December 1991 there were 16.65 million refugees in need of protection and assistance throughout the world. This figure includes

refugees as well as asylum-seekers the latter group mainly in Western Europe and North America.¹⁵ In addition, a further 3.5 to 4 million were thought to be in "refugee-like situations," though estimates are probably extremely conservative. Finally, the report includes an estimate of 23 million people who were internally displaced.¹⁶ (See box)

Refugee and asylum problems cannot be solved by simply opening doors. But there is an increasing need for sanctuary, which can only be met by international co-operation with selective resettlement as an option. If such an approach is to be viable in the long term, it must also extend the reach of co-operation to take in the developing countries who carry the primary burden.

Root causes

The developing countries' attitude towards refugees, on the whole, has been that mass movements are temporary, and that any crisis will be relatively short. Regional conventions in Africa and the Americas have formalized broader definitions of the term "refugee", based on recognition that "groups of forced migrants have a prima facie claim to being in a refugee-like situation."¹⁷

The conditions likely to produce political instability, extreme social division and ethnic conflict in the developing world are part of the broader problem of uneven economic development. As a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees pointed out: "The root causes [of refugee movement] have to do with the whole North-South issue of economics, trade, debt and employment."¹⁸ A number of recent documents on the subject have also recognized the linkage of the refugee question to broader issues of global political economy. These include a report of the German Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Refugees,¹⁹ the Swedish Ministry of Labour Working Group Report,²⁰ and the summary report on the ILO/UNHCR Joint Meetings of May 1992.²¹

It is important to recognize the common roots of refugee and other forms of mass movement of populations. At the same time, despite the difficulty of distinguishing between political and socio-economic causes of migration, there is a clear need to distinguish between refugees and other groups of migrants.

Participation in international efforts of burden-sharing would ensure that most refugee problems would be dealt with in their regions of origin. Mass movement across borders will occur — flight from generalized violence and disorder; from natural disaster and ecological devasta-



UNHCR/A. Hallmann

tion. To avoid conflict between local populations and migrants over scarce resources, such movements call for adequate support to countries of first asylum. Support must take into account the conditions of the local population, as well as of the refugees. In other words, there is a need to link refugee relief with the development needs of the populations of countries providing asylum. This has been recognized in several cases, for example Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The UNHCR and the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator are currently addressing the need to blend relief with development assistance in order to address conditions producing movement, and not merely to provide for short-term survival.²² This would avoid the real danger that a country of refuge might become the site of further violence, as refugee movement placed unsustainable burdens on marginal land, and threatened the livelihood of local populations already living below the poverty level.

Refugees in developing countries are usually regarded as temporary visitors. But some have to stay in the host country for years, like these Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Refugees and Asylum-seekers — the Development Dimension

Burden-sharing also requires a further willingness in the region and outside to secure **adequate conditions for repatriation**, or to arrive at an acceptable alternative long-term solution for refugees. Efforts to provide adequate support to voluntary repatriation are at a very early stage. Substantial numbers have returned home in the past 12 years or so to former conflict zones in central America, southern Africa, Indo-China and Sri Lanka. However, in many cases, such movement is not matched by attention to long-term development needs. Given the large size of refugee populations and the difficulties in both receiving countries and countries of origin, **this issue is of major importance to an effective international refugee system, and to its coherence as an element of a new global order.**

Given the determination of northern states to make asylum less accessible, it is important not to discourage countries of first asylum from admitting refugees.²³ A refugee system must therefore be related to — though distinct from — a broader regime **monitoring international migration.**

Countries fearing that refugees are unwanted economic migrants in another guise might consider **providing sanctuary** while withholding the right to permanent residence. This approach could only be effective if combined with efforts towards acceptable repatriation — but also with a broad-based determination to address the root causes of refugee movement, to recognize that the context is global, and not

merely national or regional, and to bring pressure to bear on states systematically using violence and oppression against specified groups. As Gervase Coles points out, "it is respect for, and the implementation of, human rights, which is the foundation of peace and security, not vice-versa."²⁴ International efforts would also seek to create conditions under which people who have been suffering from impoverishment and oppression might begin to build the foundations of **sustainable livelihoods** in their own countries.

Attention to governance, human rights and conflict mediation will help to create the climate in which social and economic development can begin. Beyond this, there is a need to tackle the root causes of involuntary migration: among these must be attention to **population size, growth and distribution**, and their role in creating instability.

Refugees provide the bitter human evidence that social and economic tensions overflow national boundaries. As globalization of production, services and trade continues in the 21st century, the international community must take this into account and introduce an element of global equity to ensure that all countries share in the benefits of development. Such concerted action will reduce to a minimum the situations that produce refugees, and permit generosity to those who are forced to leave their countries.

ESTIMATES ON ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA 1983-1991 (ROUNDED FIGURES)

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1983-1991
Europe	75,000	110,000	178,500	214,700	203,150	243,950	321,900	461,100	599,400	2,407,700
IGC Countries	65,400	98,300	164,400	194,200	172,250	220,450	306,900	426,100	544,400	2,192,400
Central Eastern and Southern Europe	9,600	11,700	14,100	20,500	30,900	23,500	15,000	35,000	55,000	215,300
North America	25,000	31,400	28,400	41,900	61,100	102,000	122,000	109,600	100,500	621,900
Canada	5,000	7,100	8,400	23,000	35,000	45,000	22,000	36,000	30,500	212,000
USA	20,000	24,300	20,000	18,900	26,100	57,000	100,000	73,600	70,000	409,900
Australia	—	—	—	—	—	—	500	3,600	16,000	20,100
Total	100,000	141,400	206,900	256,600	264,250	345,950	444,400	574,300	715,900	3,049,700

Source: See Chapter 3, note 5.

7. Rethinking the Linkages: Policy Responses for the 1990s

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POPULATION
1993

The Report so far has discussed migration in the 1990s, its implications and its impact on overall development prospects. The discussion highlights linkages and interdependencies within countries and between different groups of countries; it also calls attention to the importance of decisions by individual men and women.

Internal Migration

Urbanization itself is a process with costs and benefits to both sides, the result depending on the point of view of the observer as well as objective factors. Squatter and shanty settlements frequently lack even basic facilities, yet their inhabitants find them preferable to rural poverty. The decision to try urban life is not always final; for many migrants, it is a brief sojourn or a cyclical alternative to life in the village. Some migrants to the metropolis eventually settle in semi-rural areas or smaller cities.

Urban growth may stimulate agriculture as well as urban employment and accelerate the process of adaptation to the needs of the modern economy. But in many developing countries heavy in-migration is removing the young and able from the rural workforce and overwhelming the capacity of the urban areas to create jobs and provide public services. The result is marginal gain for some individual migrants, coupled with a net loss to both rural and urban areas, and an overall decline in the well-being of the population.¹

Since the early 1960s, governments have expressed strong dissatisfaction with the spatial distribution of their populations.² Policy responses are in three broad categories:³

1. policies that seek to transform the rural economy and thus reduce the incentives for out-migration;

2. land settlement/colonization schemes;

3. stimulation of intermediate centres and secondary cities.

1. *Rural retention/development programmes* have succeeded in a few cases. For example in Japan and the Republic of Korea broad-based land reform and reform of agricultural markets, along with social services in rural areas, have encouraged equity between rural and urban areas. In Sri Lanka and Malaysia, more modest integrated rural development programmes have also achieved positive results.⁴

2. *Resettlement programmes* have been rather unsuccessful at redistributing population, despite substantial investments by government. They have also created social divisions and conflict over resources between the settlers and locals, especially where the two groups are ethnically distinct,⁵ and may be responsible for environmental damage.

3. The most frequent policy response has been to *stimulate the economies of small and medium-sized cities*, usually by encouraging industries to locate in targeted areas. The Republic of Korea in the 1970s and 1980s succeeded in attracting industry away from Seoul to the south-eastern coastal centres. The capital's annual population growth rate declined from 9.8 per cent from 1966-70 to 2.8 per cent in 1980-85. In the same period, other cities grew at a rate of 5 per cent.

Japan also achieved some success in the post 1962 period in developing "counter-magnets", and in supporting a regional redistribution of incomes. In the Japanese case, support for secondary cities was linked to broader rural and regional development programmes.⁶

The Japanese experience is now available to other countries in Asia through an information exchange programme devel-



United Nations
Population Fund
UNFPA

oped by the city of Kobe. The city government provides technical assistance in urban management and supports the Asian Urban Information Centre of Kobe which collects and disseminates data on urban problems in the region.

Policies of this kind must overcome the difficulty that while benefits may flow to poorer regions, the resources do not necessarily improve the livelihood of poor people, and income disparities within the region may increase.⁷

If well-paid work were available at home, many people would never migrate.



Liaison/Robin Meyer

Generally, policies aimed at limiting rural-urban migration have been unsuccessful. The reasons include failure to link human settlement policies and programmes with other national policies — trade, industrial and infrastructure policies, as well as agricultural and food prices — which exert a far stronger pressure on economic activity and population movement than regional strategies.⁸

International Migration

Migrants quite literally “vote with their feet”. People move in search of something better, but also with a backward glance at what they leave behind. The decision for or against migration is based on their perceptions of the options available at home and elsewhere. Much depends on citizens’ aspirations, and what they feel about the ability of government and society to respond.

The decision is influenced by external factors, including demographic pressures, the existence of networks and support systems and the behaviour of relatives, friends and neighbours. Many of these influences are long-term; for example high fertility in the past influences present migration trends. Once the migratory process has been set in motion and the channels of migration are established, it is a matter of perhaps generations before policies will have their full effect.

Migrants’ options are also determined partly by personal assets and capabilities, which in turn depend on childhood status — nutrition, access to education and health services, and in later life opportunities for employment, housing and a secure family life. The decision to migrate can be influenced by a balanced development strategy that takes people and their needs seriously.

Countries such as the Republic of Korea or Singapore (and now Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand as well) which emphasized education, health and family planning services at an early stage of national development, with emphasis on equal opportunities for girls and boys, have opened up broader possibilities for personal development. This is reflected in national resilience and the ability to maintain economic growth in the face of recession or other external

forces. It has also reduced dependence on migration as a strategy to improve personal circumstances.

The Individual in Development

Families or households as decision-making and economic units form the basis for economic growth through their savings, investment and production, and by the allocation of benefits and responsibilities to individuals. They are also the basis for social development, starting with decisions on family size; and for personal fulfilment, starting at or before birth. Effective national development policies address this reality.

Migration decisions are about family security and long-term life-chances, rather than simply the maximization of income. They are ultimately strategies designed to look after the individual's and the household's needs, safeguard their security, and respond to their aspirations.

Given secure rights to resources and reliable access to services, people will behave in ways that demonstrate their confidence in the future. Under such conditions, even poor families are likely to invest their time and scarce resources in improving the environments in which they live,⁹ giving thought among other things to birth spacing and smaller families. In other words, when treated with respect, given support and conditions in which they can feel secure, individuals and families will confront their problems and develop their own solutions. As the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development pointed out in 1987, people are "a creative resource, and this creativity is an asset societies must tap".¹⁰

National policies

Continuing migration, both to the city and internationally, seems inevitable. The aim must be to bring some balance to the forces driving migration so as to maximize its benefits and minimize its risks.

A recent study of migratory pressures in the Philippines¹¹ examined the connections between development and migration, and drew a distinction between the personal "ability to migrate" and "need to migrate". The study suggested that, over time, it will be essential — if the goal is to reduce

migration pressures, through development — to increase the *capacity* but reduce the *desire* to migrate. In the short term, economic growth and the development of human capabilities will enhance both capacity and desire to migrate. Movement will therefore continue; but because the pressure to migrate has been reduced, the "excess demand" for migration will diminish, and with it migratory potential.

National policies in population and development catering to the needs of the individual will be critical to reducing migratory potential. Family planning, reproductive health care, education on an equal basis for girls and boys, all contribute to this end. They widen the range of choice available, as well as contributing to smaller family size. Also critical are long-term initiatives designed to provide jobs; land reform; more emphasis on rural development; and access to credit and the means of livelihood for the poor.¹²

Experience suggests that effective programmes in all these areas must be built slowly and carefully, with emphasis on the individual and the family, but in the context of national policy and institutional reform. The legal and political environment must allow for a greater measure of control over their own lives by those at the bottom of the scale. This is particularly critical in the rural areas, where the distance, socially and geographically, from the centres of government is greater.

The importance of placing personal or individual development at the top of the public expenditure priority list is reinforced by the findings of a large volume of research, which has demonstrated emphatically that spending on cost-effective and relevant health, education and training activities enhances economic growth. Such investment is "characterized by social rates of return and gestation periods which are respectively higher and shorter than those of practically all investments in physical infrastructure and several of those in manufacturing."¹³

Decentralization and the strengthening of local institutions, along with the greater role to be assigned to NGOs and local associations, is common ground for both the economic reform and individual development agendas. Emphasis on institutional capacity at the top goes along with renewed

Bangladesh - The Rights of Women: Law, Custom, and Human Capital

A report found that, on the surface, the legal status of women in Bangladesh appears to be almost on a par with that of men. The Constitution ensures equality of the sexes, but also acknowledges unequal status by reserving the right to make special provisions for women, including employment quotas. While the Constitution empowers the government to take affirmative action for women, civil laws affording women protection tend to reduce women's status and mobility. Labour laws provide women many benefits, but women enjoy few. Laws relating to marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and maintenance are governed by community religious laws and, in certain cases, men have greater rights than women. A woman generally exchanges the right to inherit for that to visit the parental home a few times a year after her parents die. Dowry is prohibited by law, but fines and imprisonment are not effectively enforced.

The report indicated that, by custom, the life of a woman in Bangladesh is shaped by the patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal social system. Her reproductive role is emphasized by social, cultural, and religious traditions. To fulfil this role, a girl is married at puberty and immediately locked into high-fertility patterns. The various elements of the social system thus interact to make women dependent on men or at risk when deserted and to produce a rigid division of labour and a labour market highly segregated by gender. The household is the primary production and consumption unit. Men generally own and manage family land and income and women's labour. Women's ability to acquire new ideas, skills, contacts, and employment outside the home is restricted. As a result, men have generally been the main beneficiaries of economic development, while women have remained largely unskilled or semi-skilled.

The report concluded that most of the concerns about development in Bangladesh cannot be effectively addressed without easing the constraints faced by women with respect to human and productive resource development. Without appropriate investment in women's education and health and increased female participation in production, human capital will continue to remain undeveloped and the economy of Bangladesh will suffer unnecessarily the consequences in terms of foregone production, diminished family welfare (particularly of the poor), and rapid population growth.

Paula Valad

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efforts to improve service delivery at the local level. This will require the public sector to share responsibility with — or devolve responsibility to — other organizations, and to secure local involvement in deciding how to use scarce resources to best effect.¹⁴

Individual Development and Gender Bias

Low social and economic status of women, marked by lack of access to economic resources and social services, has been called the "single most important reason for the persistence of widespread poverty and continued high population growth."¹⁵

Conventional development strategies tend to assume that household members share a common standard of living. In reality, women and men may operate in separate economies, and indicators of well-being may differ widely between female and male family members. The traditional division of labour in the domestic sphere ensures that women tend to be the main providers for family needs, even in male-headed households. In subsistence economies, for example, women usually cover between 40 to 100 per cent of a family's basic needs, and this tendency continues when they enter the cash economy: studies on income allocation by gender have found that virtually 100 per cent of cash income by women tends to be allocated for household needs, compared with 75 per cent or less of husbands' incomes.

While strategic reorientation is the first step towards correcting gender bias in development efforts, a 1980 report by the United Nations Development Programme discovered that "difficulties are encountered in actually programming for women's participation in development".¹⁶ These problems include the lack of data on women's productive roles; women's lack of access to appropriate training and education; and the negative impact of technology.


Chapter 5 showed how such constraints on women's autonomy translate into additional migration pressures through a combination of economic and social factors rarely faced by men. A strong indicator of persistent gender bias in development is the well-documented widespread poverty among female-headed households because

of women's economic disadvantages as compared with men. Given the growing importance of women as the sole source of household income, development strategies need to focus on full equality for women in access to productive assets, education and health care. In addition, social development has to afford women the capacity to exercise control over family size and the timing of pregnancies. Only reproductive choice enables women to plan for their future and the prospects of their families.

Equal access to education for girls and women is one of the most critical components in efforts to reduce poverty and high fertility. It has been demonstrated that women with seven or more years education marry, on average, more than five years later than women without any education, and have 2-3 fewer children.¹⁷ Nevertheless, secondary enrolment levels for girls remain low, ranging from 52 per cent in Latin America, to 26 per cent in Asia and 14 per cent in Africa.

Women's economic opportunities also affect desired family size. One analysis of the World Fertility Survey data from 20 developing countries found that "female participation in the labour force emerges as the single most important determinant of marital fertility". Yet an increase in social and economic autonomy would be a limited experience for women without the information and means to exercise reproductive choice. The provision of adequate health care and family planning services is of pivotal importance in securing women's reproductive rights, including reproductive health.

Maternal and infant deaths are closely correlated with pregnancies that occur too early or late in life, too frequently and too close to the birth of the previous child. Access to family planning services is crucial in order to prevent unwanted or high-risk pregnancies that kill 1,370 women worldwide every day. Although some 95 per cent of people in east Asia have ready access to such services, they are available to only 57 per cent in southeast Asia and Latin America, and 54 per cent in south Asia. In the Arab States region, the proportion falls to 13-25 per cent, and in sub-Saharan Africa to 9 per cent.¹⁸ A woman's ability to control her fertility is a major ele-



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ment in allowing her to improve her own and her family's prospects for the future.

Systematic efforts to widen the range of life choices available to women are also an essential condition for slower population growth. Without effective rights and secure control over productive assets, women's insurance against the future lies in their children, and especially boy children. Under such conditions, having large families is the only effective strategy.

The marginal position of women is reflected in the lack of attention given to reproductive health care and family planning. Such gender bias constitutes, in Jodi Jacobson's words, "an enormous stumbling block on the road to a sustainable economy".

The value of investment in individual development is multiplied by interactions among the different sectors. Thus improved levels of girls' education means, in

Educated women, like this cancer researcher, have better jobs and smaller families.



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the long run, reduced birth-rates and improved health for all family members. In turn, better health for children improves educational performance, while children from smaller families are better-fed, healthier, and are capable of doing better in school. The linkages among improvements in education, the health of children, the standing of women in society, reproductive health care and family planning together can break the cycle of poverty and demographic instability.

Development Assistance

Development priorities of this kind link migration-reduction approaches with the core elements of a poverty reduction and sustainable development strategy. This linkage is of some importance in focussing the attention of the donor community on mass migration—and the regions likely to produce it.

Long-term external support will be required to make balanced development a reality, particularly in areas of rapid population growth and potential mass outward flows.

A series of European ministerial-level meetings since 1990 have suggested a range of bilateral and multilateral forms of economic cooperation. So has the US Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic

Development, which gave particular priority to trade and foreign direct investment.

Modest efforts at targeted assistance to specific migrant-producing countries have begun under the auspices of the "Informal Consultations". Romania, Albania, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Ghana and Turkey are among the first priority countries.¹⁹ A series of bilateral arrangements between Germany and its neighbours to the east provide opportunities for temporary labour migration in return for the sending state's agreement to monitor and restrict other forms of population movement.

Migrants — except under conditions of extreme political or environmental stress — are not the poorest in their communities; but the springs of migratory movement are found in poverty and economic insecurity. Highly coordinated allocation of development assistance can help establish priorities and focus attention on basic needs. The challenge to both international donors and co-operating governments is to focus programme spending in areas where it is to be most effective. The individual woman and man is both the object and the agent of every effective development programme: strengthening their capacity and widening their range of choice is the best guarantee of balanced, sustainable development.

Recommendations

The free movement of people, the urbanization process and the international flow of skills and labour are essential elements of a productive economy. However, in many parts of the world, current movements of people challenge the abilities of societies to adapt, and strain institutional capacity for planning, management, and service delivery.

Internal migration

1. In order to reduce unwanted high fertility rates in rural areas, the provision of social services, including education, health care and family planning, should receive priority attention.
2. Reproductive and maternal/child health care and family planning services should give special attention to the needs of migrant women in marginal situations.
3. Population distribution policies should be an integral part of development policies. This requires strategies of simultaneous rural and urban investments which should aim to improve life chances for a wide spectrum of the population and to meet the needs of people and enterprises in the locations where they establish themselves.
4. The spatial distribution of population and migration flows are affected by many government policies. Their impact on population should be taken into account.
5. With regard to urban areas, special attention should be given to infrastructure and services for the urban poor. Encouraging the growth of small and medium-sized cities may offer employment opportunities and educational

and social facilities, encouraging both urban and rural development.

6. Governments should strive to ensure gender equality in access to productive assets and social services and to eliminate legal and cultural constraints on women's autonomy and productivity. Women should be part of the population and development planning process at all levels of decision-making.
7. Changes in household composition, nuptiality and dependency patterns are leading to the transformation of social organization in many countries. Population and development plans should ensure adaptation to changing individual and family needs such as child care, care for the elderly, and social service delivery to single women and single mothers.
8. Decentralization, including strengthening local institutions and non-governmental organizations, provides impetus for innovation in economic enterprises and delivery of social services. Such a strategy, along with a greater role for community and women's groups, would help ensure that reproductive health and family planning services are sensitive to the needs of individual women and men.
9. The linkages between population growth, migration and environment should receive more attention and should be considered in all national development plans.

International migration

10. The international community should take account of the possible effects of economic, trade and development cooperation policies on international migration flows.



Recommendations

11. The international community should promote the exchange of information on national trends and policies on international migration. An institutional mechanism is needed to facilitate dialogue about the movement of people and its global, regional and national implications.
12. Attention should be given to revisions in international migration legislation and regulations that result in discriminatory practices against female migrants. In addition, special measures are needed to protect the rights and safety of migrant women in potentially exploitative circumstances.
13. More research is needed on population distribution, and the causes and consequences of internal and international migration to provide a firm basis for environmental, development and population distribution policies.
14. Governments need better demographic data on vital events, migration, population size and characteristics by geographical area. Improved ability to collect and analyze data will facilitate a better understanding of population change and its policy implications at local, regional and national levels.
15. Gender-specific data is essential for formulation of policies addressing the situation of women. In particular, more information is needed on women migrants, and on women-headed households in both sending and receiving areas.
16. Urgent action is needed to establish common international classifications of migrants and migration, as a basis for study, analysis and discussion of internationally-agreed policy approaches.

Data and research needs

13. More research is needed on population distribution, and the causes and consequences of internal and international migration to provide a firm basis for

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POPULATION INDICATORS

Country or Territory	Population (millions)		Average growth rate (%) 1990-95	Birth rate per 1,000 1990-95	Death rate per 1,000 1990-95	Life expectancy 1990-95	Infant mortality per 1,000 1990-95	Per cent urban 1992	Urban growth rate (%) 1990-95	Fertility rate per woman 1990-95
	1992	2025								
World Total	5,479.0	8,472.4	1.7	26	9	65	62	44	2.7	3.3
More Developed Regions (+)	1,224.7	1,403.3	0.5	14	10	75	12	73	0.9	1.9
Less Developed Regions (+)	4,254.3	7,069.2	2.0	29	9	62	69	35	3.7	3.6
AFRICA	681.7	1,582.5	2.9	43	14	53	95	33	4.6	6.0
Eastern Africa (1)	207.4	518.0	3.1	48	16	49	108	20	5.8	6.8
Burundi	5.8	13.4	2.9	46	17	48	106	6	5.6	6.8
Ethiopia	53.0	130.7	3.1	49	18	47	122	13	4.9	7.0
Kenya	25.2	63.8	3.4	44	10	59	66	25	6.8	6.3
Madagascar	12.8	33.7	3.3	45	13	55	110	25	6.1	6.6
Malawi	10.4	24.9	3.3	54	21	44	142	12	6.2	7.6
Mauritius (2)	1.1	1.4	1.0	18	7	70	21	41	1.1	2.0
Mozambique	14.9	36.3	2.8	45	18	47	147	30	8.1	6.5
Rwanda	7.5	20.6	3.4	52	18	46	110	6	5.2	8.5
Somalia	9.2	23.4	3.2	50	19	47	122	25	4.5	7.0
Uganda	18.7	45.9	3.0	51	21	42	104	12	5.5	7.3
United Rep. of Tanzania	27.8	74.2	3.4	48	15	51	102	22	6.7	6.8
Zambia	8.6	21.0	2.8	46	18	44	84	42	3.4	6.3
Zimbabwe	10.6	22.9	3.0	41	11	56	59	30	5.5	5.3
Middle Africa (3)	75.1	190.0	3.1	46	15	51	96	33	4.7	6.5
Angola	9.9	26.6	3.7	51	19	46	124	30	6.5	7.2
Cameroon	12.2	29.3	2.8	41	12	56	63	42	5.1	5.7
Central African Republic	3.2	7.0	2.6	44	18	47	105	48	4.4	6.2
Chad	5.8	12.9	2.7	44	18	48	122	34	6.0	5.9
Congo	2.4	5.8	3.0	45	15	52	82	42	4.5	6.3
Gabon	1.2	2.9	3.3	43	16	54	94	47	5.3	5.3
Zaire	39.9	104.5	3.2	47	15	52	93	28	4.0	6.7
Northern Africa (4)	147.7	280.4	2.5	34	9	61	69	45	3.5	4.7
Algeria	26.3	51.8	2.7	34	7	66	61	53	4.3	4.9
Egypt	54.8	93.5	2.2	31	9	62	57	44	2.6	4.1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	4.9	12.9	3.5	42	8	63	68	84	4.4	6.4
Morocco	26.3	47.5	2.4	32	8	63	68	47	3.4	4.4
Sudan	26.7	60.6	2.8	42	14	52	99	23	4.6	6.0
Tunisia	8.4	13.4	2.1	27	6	68	43	57	3.2	3.4
Southern Africa	45.3	85.3	2.4	32	9	63	55	47	3.3	4.2
Botswana	1.3	2.9	2.9	38	9	61	60	27	7.4	5.1
Lesotho	1.8	3.8	2.5	34	10	61	79	21	6.1	4.7
Namibia	1.5	3.8	3.2	43	11	59	70	29	5.5	6.0
South Africa	39.8	73.2	2.4	31	9	63	53	50	3.1	4.1
Western Africa (5)	206.2	510.8	3.1	46	15	51	102	35	5.4	6.5
Benin	4.9	12.4	3.1	49	18	48	87	40	5.0	7.1
Burkina Faso	9.5	22.6	2.8	47	18	48	118	17	8.2	6.5
Côte d'Ivoire	12.9	37.9	3.7	50	15	52	91	42	5.3	7.4
Ghana	16.0	38.0	3.0	42	12	56	81	35	4.4	6.0
Guinea	6.1	15.1	3.0	51	20	45	134	27	5.9	7.0
Guinea-Bissau	1.0	2.0	2.1	43	21	44	140	21	4.5	5.8
Liberia	2.8	7.2	3.3	47	14	55	126	47	5.6	6.8
Mali	9.8	24.6	3.2	51	19	46	159	25	5.8	7.1
Mauritania	2.1	5.0	2.9	46	18	48	117	49	5.8	6.5
Niger	8.3	21.3	3.3	51	19	47	124	21	6.9	7.1
Nigeria	115.7	285.8	3.1	45	14	53	96	37	5.5	6.4
Senegal	7.7	17.1	2.7	43	16	49	80	41	4.0	6.1
Sierra Leone	4.4	9.8	2.7	48	22	43	143	34	5.1	6.5
Togo	3.8	9.4	3.2	45	13	55	85	29	4.9	6.6
ASIA	3,233.0	4,900.3	1.8	26	8	65	62	32	3.5	3.2
Eastern Asia (8)	1,387.9	1,762.2	1.3	20	7	72	26	35	3.4	2.1
China	1,188.0	1,539.8	1.4	21	7	71	27	28	4.4	2.2
Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea	22.6	33.3	1.9	24	5	71	24	60	2.4	2.4
Hong Kong	5.8	6.4	0.8	13	6	78	6	94	1.0	1.4
Japan	124.5	127.0	0.4	11	7	79	5	77	0.6	1.7
Mongolia	2.3	4.8	2.6	34	8	64	60	59	3.7	4.6
Republic of Korea	44.2	50.3	0.8	16	6	71	21	74	2.3	1.8

POPULATION INDICATORS

Country or Territory	Population (millions)		Average growth rate (%) 1990-95	Birth rate per 1,000 1990-95	Death rate per 1,000 1990-95	Life expectancy 1990-95	Infant mortality per 1,000 1990-95	Per cent urban 1992	Urban growth rate (%) 1990-95	Fertility rate per woman 1990-95
	1992	2025								
Southeastern Asia	461.5	715.6	1.9	28	8	63	55	30	3.8	3.4
Cambodia	8.8	16.7	2.5	39	14	51	116	12	4.6	4.5
Indonesia	191.2	283.3	1.8	27	8	63	65	30	4.3	3.1
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	4.5	9.4	3.0	45	15	51	97	20	6.3	6.7
Malaysia	18.8	31.3	2.4	29	5	71	14	45	4.3	3.6
Myanmar	43.7	75.6	2.1	33	11	58	81	25	3.3	4.2
Philippines	65.2	105.1	2.1	30	7	65	40	44	3.5	3.9
Singapore	2.8	3.3	1.0	16	6	74	8	100	1.0	1.7
Thailand	56.1	72.3	1.3	21	6	69	26	23	4.0	2.2
Viet Nam	69.5	117.0	2.0	29	9	64	36	20	2.9	3.9
Southern Asia	1,244.3	2,135.8	2.2	32	10	59	90	27	3.5	4.3
Afghanistan	19.1	45.8	6.7	53	22	43	162	19	8.9	6.9
Bangladesh	119.3	223.3	2.4	38	14	53	108	18	6.0	4.7
Bhutan	1.6	3.4	2.3	40	17	48	129	6	6.2	5.9
India	879.5	1,393.9	1.9	29	10	60	88	26	2.9	3.9
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	61.6	144.6	2.7	40	7	67	40	58	4.0	6.0
Nepal	20.6	40.1	2.5	37	13	54	99	12	7.2	5.5
Pakistan	124.8	259.6	2.7	41	10	59	98	33	4.4	6.2
Sri Lanka	17.7	24.7	1.3	21	6	72	24	22	2.2	2.5
Western Asia (7)	139.3	286.6	2.7	34	7	66	54	65	4.2	4.7
Iraq	19.3	46.3	3.2	39	7	66	58	73	4.0	5.7
Israel	5.1	8.1	4.7	21	7	77	9	92	5.0	2.9
Jordan	4.3	10.8	3.4	40	5	68	36	69	4.5	5.7
Kuwait	2.0	2.8	5.8	28	2	75	14	93	5.4	3.7
Lebanon	2.8	4.5	2.0	27	7	69	34	86	2.8	3.1
Oman	1.6	4.7	3.6	40	5	70	30	12	7.4	6.7
Saudi Arabia	15.9	40.4	3.4	36	5	69	31	78	4.2	6.4
Syrian Arab Republic	13.3	35.3	3.6	42	6	67	39	51	4.5	6.1
Turkey	58.4	92.9	2.0	28	7	67	56	64	4.6	3.5
United Arab Emirates	1.7	2.8	2.3	21	4	71	22	82	3.1	4.5
Yemen	12.5	34.2	3.5	48	14	53	106	31	6.7	7.2
EUROPE	512.0	541.8	0.3	13	11	75	10	74	0.7	1.7
Eastern Europe	96.9	107.2	0.2	14	11	71	16	64	1.0	2.0
Bulgaria	9.0	8.8	-0.2	13	12	72	14	69	0.6	1.8
Czechoslovakia	15.7	17.9	0.3	14	11	73	10	79	1.2	2.0
Hungary	10.5	10.4	-0.2	12	14	70	14	66	0.9	1.8
Poland	38.4	43.8	0.3	14	10	72	15	63	1.0	2.1
Romania	23.3	26.3	0.3	16	11	70	23	55	1.2	2.1
Northern Europe (8)	92.8	97.8	0.2	14	11	76	7	83	0.4	1.9
Denmark	5.2	5.1	0.2	12	12	76	7	85	0.4	1.7
Estonia	1.6	1.7	-0.2	14	12	71	14	72	0.2	2.0
Finland	5.0	5.2	0.3	13	10	76	6	60	0.4	1.8
Ireland	3.5	3.6	-0.2	14	9	75	7	58	0.3	2.1
Latvia	2.7	2.8	-0.3	14	12	71	10	72	0.2	2.0
Lithuania	3.8	4.1	0.2	15	10	73	10	70	1.2	2.0
Norway	4.3	4.9	0.5	15	11	77	8	76	1.1	2.0
Sweden	8.7	9.5	0.5	14	11	78	8	84	0.7	2.1
United Kingdom	57.7	60.3	0.2	14	11	76	7	89	0.3	1.9
Southern Europe (9)	144.6	148.2	0.2	11	10	76	12	67	0.9	1.5
Albania	3.3	4.5	0.8	23	5	73	23	36	1.7	2.7
Greece	10.2	10.1	0.3	10	10	78	8	63	1.1	1.5
Italy	57.8	56.2	0.1	10	10	77	8	70	0.5	1.3
Portugal	9.9	10.1	0.0	12	10	75	12	35	1.6	1.5
Spain	39.1	40.6	0.2	11	9	78	7	79	0.7	1.4
Yugoslavia (former)	23.9	26.1	0.3	14	10	72	23	58	1.9	1.9
Western Europe (10)	177.6	188.7	0.4	12	11	76	7	80	0.6	1.6
Austria	7.8	8.3	0.4	12	11	76	8	59	1.2	1.5
Belgium	10.0	9.9	0.1	12	11	76	8	96	0.2	1.7
France	57.2	60.8	0.4	13	10	77	7	73	0.4	1.8
Germany	80.3	83.8	0.4	11	11	76	7	86	0.7	1.5
Netherlands	15.2	17.7	0.7	14	9	77	7	89	0.8	1.7
Switzerland	6.8	7.7	0.7	13	10	78	7	62	1.5	1.7

POPULATION INDICATORS

Country or Territory	Population (millions)		Average growth rate (%) 1990-95	Birth rate per 1,000 1990-95	Death rate per 1,000 1990-95	Life expectancy 1990-95	Infant mortality per 1,000 1990-95	Per cent urban 1992	Urban growth rate (%) 1990-95	Fertility rate per woman 1990-95
	1992	2025								
LATIN AMERICA	457.7	701.6	1.8	26	7	68	47	73	2.6	3.1
Caribbean (11)	34.6	50.4	1.4	24	8	69	47	60	2.3	2.8
Cuba	10.8	13.0	0.9	17	7	76	14	74	1.5	1.9
Dominican Republic	7.5	11.4	2.0	28	6	68	57	62	3.4	3.3
Haiti	6.8	13.1	2.0	35	12	57	86	30	4.1	4.8
Jamaica	2.5	3.5	1.0	22	6	74	14	54	2.2	2.4
Puerto Rico	3.6	4.7	0.9	18	7	75	13	75	1.6	2.2
Trinidad and Tobago	1.3	1.8	1.1	23	6	71	18	65	1.6	2.7
Central America (12)	118.6	199.2	2.2	30	6	69	39	67	3.0	3.5
Costa Rica	3.2	5.6	2.4	26	4	76	14	48	3.6	3.1
El Salvador	5.4	9.7	2.2	33	7	66	46	45	3.2	4.0
Guatemala	9.7	21.7	2.9	39	8	65	49	40	4.0	5.4
Honduras	5.5	11.5	3.0	37	7	66	60	45	4.9	4.9
Mexico	88.2	137.5	2.1	28	5	70	35	74	2.8	3.2
Nicaragua	4.0	9.1	3.7	40	7	67	52	61	4.9	5.0
Panama	2.5	3.9	1.9	25	5	73	21	54	2.7	2.9
South America (13)	304.5	451.9	1.7	24	7	67	51	76	2.4	2.9
Argentina	33.1	45.5	1.2	20	9	71	29	87	1.5	2.8
Bolivia	7.5	14.1	2.4	34	9	61	85	52	3.8	4.6
Brazil	154.1	219.7	1.6	23	7	66	57	76	2.5	2.7
Chile	13.6	19.8	1.6	23	6	72	17	85	1.9	2.7
Colombia	33.4	49.4	1.7	24	6	69	37	71	2.5	2.7
Ecuador	11.1	18.6	2.3	30	7	67	57	58	3.8	3.6
Paraguay	4.5	9.2	2.7	33	6	67	47	49	4.1	4.3
Peru	22.5	37.4	2.0	29	8	65	76	71	2.8	3.6
Uruguay	3.1	3.7	0.6	17	10	72	20	89	0.9	2.3
Venezuela	20.2	32.7	2.1	26	5	70	33	91	2.7	3.1
NORTHERN AMERICA (14)	282.7	360.5	1.1	16	9	76	8	76	1.3	2.0
Canada	27.4	38.4	1.4	14	8	77	7	78	1.6	1.8
United States of America	255.2	322.0	1.0	16	9	76	8	76	1.3	2.1
OCEANIA	27.5	41.3	1.5	19	8	73	22	71	1.6	2.5
Australia-New Zealand	21.1	29.5	1.3	15	8	77	7	85	1.4	1.9
Australia (15)	17.6	25.2	1.4	15	8	77	7	85	1.4	1.9
New Zealand	3.5	4.3	0.9	17	8	76	8	84	1.0	2.1
Melanesia (16)	5.5	10.2	2.2	32	9	59	49	21	3.8	4.6
Papua New Guinea	4.1	7.8	2.3	33	11	56	54	17	4.7	4.9
USSR (former) (17)	284.5	344.5	0.5	16	10	70	21	67	1.1	2.3

DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES (for the newly independent states of the former USSR)

Country	Population (thousands)	Growth rate (per cent)	Crude birth rate (per 1,000)	Crude death rate (per 1,000)	Total fertility rate (per woman)	Life expectancy at birth (years)	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000)
	—1992—	—1990-1992—	—1985-1990—				
Armenia	3,489	2,3	23	6	2,6	71	23
Azerbaijan	7,283	0,8	27	7	2,8	70	28
Belarus	10,295	0,1	16	10	2,0	72	13
Georgia	5,471	0,1	18	9	2,3	72	22
Kazakhstan	17,048	0,8	24	8	3,0	69	28
Kyrgyzstan	4,518	1,3	31	7	4,0	68	36
Republic of Moldova	4,362	-0,0	21	10	2,6	68	24
Russian Federation	149,003	0,2	16	11	2,1	70	19
Tadjikistan	5,587	2,5	40	7	5,4	70	46
Turkmenistan	3,861	2,5	36	8	4,6	65	54
Ukraine	52,158	0,2	14	12	2,0	71	14

SOCIAL INDICATORS

Country or Territory	Adult literacy M/F 1990	Secondary school enrollment M/F 1986-90	Births attended by health worker (%) 1983-91	Family planning users (%) 1975-91	Access to health services (%) 1985-88	Access to safe water (%) 1988-90	Food production per capita (1979-81=100) 1988-90	Agricultural population per hectare arable land 1988	GNP per capita (US\$) 1990	% of central govt. expenditure 1980-90	
										Education	Health
AFRICA											
Eastern Africa (1)											
Burundi	61/40	5/3	19	9	61	38	95	3.5	210		
Ethiopia	..	17/12	14	4	46	19	85	2.5	120		
Kenya	80/59	27/19	50	27	..	30	107	7.2	370	19.8	5.4
Madagascar	88/73	20/18	62	..	56	22	91	2.8	230		
Malawi	..	6/3	45	7	80	58	83	2.6	200	8.8	7.4
Mauritius (2)	..	53/53	85	75	100	95	103	2.4	2,250	14.4	8.6
Mozambique	45/21	7/4	25	..	39	24	86	3.9	80		
Rwanda	64/37	9/6	22	10	27	50	76	5.4	310		
Somalia	36/14	13/7	2	..	27	37	99	4.9	120		
Uganda	62/35	16/8	38	5	61	21	92	2.1	220		
United Rep. of Tanzania	93/88	5/4	60	10	76	56	88	3.9	110		
Zambia	81/65	25/14	38	15	75	60	98	1.0	420	8.6	7.4
Zimbabwe	74/60	49/42	60	43	71	66	96	2.2	640	23.4	7.6
Middle Africa (3)											
Angola	56/29	17/9	15	..	30	35	80	1.9	..		
Cameroon	66/43	31/20	45	16	41	42	90	1.0	960	12.0	3.4
Central African Republic	52/25	16/6	66	..	45	26	95	0.9	390		
Chad	42/18	12/3	15	..	30	57	97	1.3	190		
Congo	70/44	37/14	83	38	92	7.6	1,010		
Gabon	74/49	..	80	..	90	68	81	1.7	3,330		
Zaire	84/61	32/16	26	33	97	2.8	220	1.4	0.7
Northern Africa (4)											
Algeria	70/46	61/53	15	36	88	68	94	0.8	2,060		
Egypt	63/34	91/71	35	48	..	73	123	8.0	600	13.4	2.8
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	75/50	..	76	94	103	0.3	..		
Morocco	61/38	42/30	26	36	70	61	135	1.0	950		
Sudan	43/12	23/17	69	9	51	46	75	1.2	..		
Tunisia	74/56	50/39	68	50	90	92	94	0.4	1,440	16.3	6.1
Southern Africa											
Botswana	84/65	31/36	78	33	89	54	79	0.6	2,040	20.2	4.8
Lesotho	..	21/31	40	5	80	48	81	4.2	530	15.2	7.4
Namibia	26	95	0.9	..	20.8	11.1
South Africa	50	88	0.4	..		
Western Africa (5)											
Benin	32/16	23/9	45	9	18	54	118	1.5	360		
Burkina Faso	28/9	9/5	30	..	49	69	114	2.0	330		
Côte d'Ivoire	67/40	27/12	20	3	30	76	98	1.8	750		
Ghana	70/51	49/30	55	13	60	57	109	2.5	390	25.7	9.0
Guinea	35/13	14/5	25	..	47	51	87	5.6	440		
Guinea-Bissau	50/24	9/4	27	27	102	2.2	180		
Liberia	50/29	..	58	6	39	55	86	4.6	..	11.6	5.4
Mali	41/24	9/4	32	5	15	41	98	3.4	270	9.0	2.1
Mauritania	47/21	22/10	20	4	40	66	89	6.3	500		
Niger	40/17	8/3	47	..	41	61	80	1.8	310		
Nigeria	62/40	22/16	37	6	66	53	113	2.1	290		
Senegal	52/25	21/11	41	11	40	47	104	1.0	710		
Sierra Leone	31/11	23/11	25	36	88	1.4	240	10.4	3.6
Togo	56/31	33/10	15	16	61	59	98	1.6	410		
ASIA											
Eastern Asia (6)											
China	84/62	50/38	94	72	90	74	132	7.8	370		
Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea	..	100/100	100	107	3.1	..		
Hong Kong	..	71/75	100	81	99	100	62	10.9	11,490		
Japan	..	94/97	100	58	95	1.8	25,430		
Mongolia	..	88/96	99	65	89	0.5	..		
Republic of Korea	99/94	88/85	89	77	93	100	97	4.8	5,400	19.8	2.2

SOCIAL INDICATORS

Country or Territory	Adult literacy	Secondary school enrollment	Births attended by health worker (%)	Family planning users (%)	Access to health services (%)	Access to safe water (%)	Food production per capita (1979-81=100)	Agricultural population per hectare arable land	GNP per capita (US\$)	% of central gov. expenditure 1980-90	
	M/F 1990	M/F 1986-90	1983-91	1975-91	1985-88	1988-90	1988-90	1988	1990	Education	Health
Southeastern Asia											
Cambodia	48/22	45/20	47	..	53	18	163	1.8
Indonesia	84/62	52/43	32	50	80	58	128	3.9	570	8.4	2.0
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	..	31/22	67	35	121	3.1	200
Malaysia	87/70	58/59	82	51	..	79	155	1.1	2,320
Myanmar	89/72	25/23	57	..	33	31	101	1.9	..	16.8	4.6
Philippines	90/90	72/75	55	36	..	81	86	3.5	730	16.9	4.1
Singapore	..	68/71	100	74	100	100	87	14.4	11,160	18.1	4.7
Thailand	96/90	32/28	71	66	90	93	105	1.7	1,420	20.1	6.8
Viet Nam	92/84	43/40	95	53	80	42	119	6.0
Southern Asia											
Afghanistan	44/14	11/5	9	..	29	21	85	1.1
Bangladesh	47/22	23/11	5	40	45	81	97	8.3	210	11.2	4.8
Bhutan	51/25	7/2	7	..	65	32	84	10.2	190	11.6	5.3
India	62/34	54/31	33	43	..	86	119	3.1	350	2.5	1.6
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	65/43	62/44	70	..	80	89	99	1.0	2,490	22.0	8.5
Nepal	38/13	42/17	6	14	..	37	113	7.1	170	10.9	4.8
Pakistan	47/21	28/12	40	12	55	56	104	3.0	380	2.0	0.7
Sri Lanka	93/84	71/76	94	62	93	60	88	4.6	470	9.9	5.4
Western Asia (7)											
Iraq	70/49	58/37	50	14	93	92	90	0.7
Israel	..	79/86	99	100	0.5	10,920	10.2	4.1
Jordan	89/70	80/78	87	35	97	99	113	0.5	1,240	14.2	5.8
Kuwait	77/67	93/87	99	35	100	7.1	..	14.0	7.4
Lebanon	88/73	57/56	45	92	145	0.9
Oman	..	55/40	60	9	91	55	..	12.2	..	10.7	4.6
Saudi Arabia	73/48	53/39	90	..	97	94	277	4.5	7,050
Syrian Arab Republic	78/51	63/45	61	20	75	70	83	0.5	1,000	8.6	1.3
Turkey	90/71	63/39	77	63	..	78	97	0.9	1,630	19.2	3.6
United Arab Emirates	58/38	60/69	99	..	99	95	..	1.1	19,860	15.0	6.9
Yemen	53/26	42/7	12	1	38	38	80
EUROPE											
Eastern Europe											
Bulgaria	..	74/76	100	76	99	0.3	2,250	6.0	4.1
Czechoslovakia	..	84/90	100	123	0.3	3,140	1.8	0.4
Hungary	..	70/72	99	73	112	0.3	2,780	3.3	7.9
Poland	..	80/83	100	75	109	0.5	1,690
Romania	..	84/92	100	58	96	0.4	1,640	2.7	8.7
Northern Europe (8)											
Denmark	..	106/107	100	63	129	0.1	22,080	9.3	1.1
Estonia
Finland	..	103/121	100	80	108	0.2	26,040	14.4	10.8
Ireland	..	93/102	108	0.5	9,550	11.3	12.1
Latvia
Lithuania
Norway	..	96/101	..	84	101	0.3	23,120	9.4	10.4
Sweden	..	89/93	100	78	97	0.1	23,660	8.7	0.9
United Kingdom	..	82/85	100	81	107	0.2	16,100	3.2	14.6
Southern Europe (9)											
Albania	..	86/73	99
Greece	98/89	99/94	97	100	0.6	5,990
Italy	98/96	78/78	..	78	97	0.3	16,830	8.3	11.3
Portugal	89/82	47/56	90	66	107	0.5	4,900
Spain	97/93	100/111	96	59	112	0.2	11,020	5.6	12.8
Yugoslavia (former)	97/88	82/79	86	55	94	0.6	3,060
Western Europe (10)											
Austria	..	81/83	..	71	108	0.3	19,060	9.2	12.9
Belgium	..	103/104	100	81	117	0.2	15,540
France	..	93/100	94	80	100	0.2	19,490	6.8	15.2
Germany	..	92/88	99	78	112	0.3	..	0.6	19.3
Netherlands	..	105/102	100	76	115	0.6	17,320	10.8	11.7
Switzerland	99	71	104	0.6	32,680

SOCIAL INDICATORS

Country or Territory	Adult literacy M/F 1990	Secondary school enrollment M/F 1986-90	Births attended by health worker (%) 1983-91	Family planning users (%) 1975-91	Access to health services (%) 1985-88	Access to safe water (%) 1988-90	Food production per capita (1979-81=100) 1988-90	Agricultural population per hectare arable land 1988	GNP per capita (US\$) 1990	% of central govt. expenditure 1980-90	
										Education	Health
LATIN AMERICA											
Caribbean (11)											
Cuba	95/93	84/94	90	70			101	0.8			
Dominican Republic	85/82		92	56	80	83	94	1.8	830	9.5	11.3
Haiti	59/47	20/19	20	10	50	38	93	4.2	370		
Jamaica	98/89	82/88	82	55	90	100	91	2.7	1,500		
Puerto Rico				70							
Trinidad and Tobago		61/84	98	53	99	96	74	0.8	3,610		
Central America (12)											
Costa Rica	93/93	41/42	93	70	80	92	91	1.4	1,900	19.0	26.3
El Salvador	78/70	26/26	90	47	58	48	94	2.6	1,110	16.2	7.8
Guatemala	63/47	21/19	34	23	34	62	95	2.4	900	19.5	9.9
Honduras	78/71	28/36	90	41	66	65	91	1.8	690		
Nicaragua	90/85	53/53	77	53	78	71	98	1.1	2,490	13.9	1.8
Nicaragua		28/46	73	27	83	54	61	1.1			
Panama	88/88	58/63	96	84	80	84	88	1.0	1,830	18.5	17.9
South America (13)											
Argentina	96/95	69/78	87		71	86	96	0.1	2,370	9.3	12.0
Bolivia	85/71	38/31	54	30	69	53	107	0.8	650	18.0	2.3
Brazil	83/80	32/42	95	66		97	111	0.5	2,880	5.3	7.2
Chile	94/83	72/78	88		97	89	112	0.4	1,940	10.1	5.9
Colombia	88/86	52/53	94	68	60	88	109	1.7	1,280		
Ecuador	88/84	55/57	56	53	75	58	108	1.2	980	18.2	11.0
Paraguay	92/88	28/30	66	48	61	34	119	0.9	1,110	12.7	4.3
Peru	92/79	68/61	52	59	76	61	100	2.1	1,180	16.2	5.1
Uruguay	97/86	68/76	96		82	73	113	0.3	2,680	7.4	4.5
Venezuela	87/90	50/62	69	49		90	94	0.5	2,580		
NORTHERN AMERICA (14)											
Canada		104/105	99	73			106		20,470	2.9	5.5
United States of America		98/99	99	74			92		21,790	1.7	13.5
OCEANIA											
Australia-New Zealand											
Australia (15)		80/83	98	78			96		17,000	6.8	12.8
New Zealand		87/89	98	70		97	104	0.6	12,880	12.5	12.7
Melanesia (16)											
Papua New Guinea	65/38	16/10	20		96	34	106	6.6	860	15.3	8.4
USSR (Former) (17)											
							112	0.2		1.7	13.8

SELECTED INDICATORS FOR LESS POPULOUS COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES

Country or Territory	Population (millions)		Average growth rate (%) 1990-95	Birth rate per 1,000 1990-95	Death rate per 1,000 1990-95	Life expectancy 1990-95	Infant mortality per 1,000 1990-95	Per cent urban 1992	Urban growth rate (%) 1990-95	Fertility rate per woman 1990-95	GNP per capita (US\$) 1990
	1992	2025									
Bahamas	0.3	0.4	1.6	19	5	72	24	65	2.3	2.0	11,420
Bahrain	0.5	1.0	2.8	26	4	71	12	83	3.2	3.8	
Barbados	0.3	0.3	0.3	16	9	76	10	46	1.7	1.8	6,540
Brunei Darussalam	0.3	0.4	2.2	24	4	74	8	58	2.2	3.1	
Cape Verde	0.4	0.8	2.9	36	7	68	40	30	5.2	4.3	890
Comoros	0.6	1.6	3.7	48	12	56	89	29	5.9	7.1	480
Cyprus	0.7	0.9	0.9	17	8	77	9	54	2.2	2.3	8,020
Djibouti	0.5	1.2	3.0	46	16	49	112	82	3.6	6.6	
East Timor	0.8	1.2	2.0	39	19	45	150	14	4.9	4.9	
Equatorial Guinea	0.4	0.8	2.6	43	18	48	117	30	3.9	5.9	330
Fiji	0.7	1.0	1.0	24	5	71	23	40	1.7	3.0	1,780
French Polynesia	0.2	0.4	2.3	28	5	70	16	66	2.9	3.3	
Gambia	0.9	1.9	2.6	44	19	45	132	24	5.1	6.1	280
Guadeloupe	0.4	0.5	1.2	19	7	75	12	49	2.3	2.2	
Guyana	0.8	1.1	0.9	25	7	65	48	34	2.5	2.5	330
Iceland	0.3	0.3	1.0	17	7	78	5	91	1.3	2.2	21,400
Luxembourg	0.4	0.4	0.7	12	11	75	8	85	1.1	1.6	28,730
Maldives	0.2	0.5	3.0	38	8	63	55	31	5.7	6.2	450
Malta	0.4	0.4	0.7	15	8	76	9	88	1.0	2.1	6,610
Martinique	0.4	0.4	0.9	17	7	76	10	76	1.8	2.0	
Micronesia (18)	0.4	0.9	2.5	32	6	67	36	49	4.4	4.4	
Polynesia (19)	0.6	0.8	1.3	28	5	71	25	44	3.0	4.0	
Qatar	0.5	0.7	2.8	23	4	70	26	90	3.1	4.4	15,860
Reunion	0.6	0.9	1.6	21	5	74	7	65	2.7	2.3	
Solomon Islands	0.3	0.8	3.3	37	4	70	27	16	6.7	5.4	590
Suriname	0.4	0.7	1.9	26	6	70	28	49	3.1	2.7	3,050
Swaziland	0.8	1.7	2.7	37	10	58	73	28	6.2	4.9	810

NOTES:

All indicators are based on data compiled before 1 January 1992.

Data for small countries or areas, generally those with populations of 200,000 or less in 1990, are not given separately. They have been included in regional population figures.

(†) More developed regions comprise Northern America, Japan, Europe, Australia-New Zealand and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(+) Less developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding Japan), and Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.

1 Including British Indian Ocean Territory and Seychelles.

2 Including Agalesa, Rodrigues and St. Brandon.

3 Including Sao Tome and Principe.

4 Including Western Sahara.

5 Including St. Helena.

6 Including Macau.

7 Including Gaza Strip (Palestine).

8 Including Channel Islands, Faeroe Islands, and Isle of Man.

9 Including Andorra, Gibraltar, Holy See and San Marino.

10 Including Liechtenstein and Monaco.

11 Including Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands, and United States Virgin Islands.

12 Including Belize.

13 Including Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and French Guiana.

14 Including Bermuda, Greenland, and St. Pierre and Miquelon.

15 Including Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and Norfolk Island.

16 Including New Caledonia and Vanuatu.

17 Including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are included in Northern Europe.

18 Comprising Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Pacific Islands (Palau), and Wake Island.

19 Comprising American Samoa, Cook Islands, Johnston Island, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Midway Islands, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna Islands.

SOURCES:

Population Indicators:

United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 1992 Revisions*

Social Indicators:

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), *The State of Food and Agriculture 1991*

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United Nations Population Division, *World Monitoring Report 1993*, (draft)

World Bank, *World Development Report 1992*